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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2003, German citizen Khaled El-Masri found himself abducted while
on vacation in Macedonia.' Blindfolded and transported to an airport,
1. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, EI-Masri v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 373 (2007) (No. 06-
1613), 2007 WL 1624819. Macedonian officials initially detained EI-Masri while attempting to pass
through the border between Serbia and Macedonia. Id. According to EI-Masri, he was held in a
hotel and interrogated by Macedonian officials regarding alleged ties with Islamic fundamentalists
and told that he could return to Germany (his country of citizenship) if he confessed to membership
in AI-Qaeda. Id. at 2-3. Moreover, EI-Masri alleges that his interrogators denied him access to an
attorney, his family, or contact with the German embassy during confinement. Id. at 2.
213
United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) agents allegedly took over
his custody.2
There he was beaten, stripped naked, and thrown to the ground. A
hard object was forced into his anus. When his blindfold was
removed, he saw seven or eight men, dressed in black, with hoods
and black gloves. He was placed in a diaper and sweatsuit,
subjected to full sensory deprivation, shackled, and hurried to a
plane, where he was chained spread-eagled to the floor. He was
injected with drugs and flown to Baghdad, then on to Kabul,
Afghanistan.3
EI-Masri alleges that he was kept incommunicado for nearly five months,
detained in a CIA prison in Kabul, and only after a hunger strike and forced
feeding through a nasal tube was he mysteriously placed on a flight to
Germany and released.4
The public will probably never learn what actually happened because
the government asserted the "state secrets privilege" upon commencement of
El-Masri's civil lawsuit.5 With this privilege, the government protects state
2. Id. at 3. "After twenty-three days of detention, Mr. EI-Masri was videotaped, blindfolded,
and transported to an airport, where he was turned over to U.S. agents." Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 3-5. According to EI-Masri, hooded men came into his cell and force-fed him through
a nasal tube after four weeks of a self-initiated hunger strike. Id. at 4. E1-Masri told the press that
"[a]fter five months, they simply took me back and dropped me like a piece of luggage in the woods
of Albania." Bill Mears, Supreme Court Refuses to Hear CIA Kidnapping Allegation, CNN.com,
Oct. 9, 2007, http://www.cnn.com/2OO7/US/law/10/09/cia.rendition/index.html. After being
dropped in Albania, EI-Masri was allegedly transported to Mother Theresa Airport in Tirana,
Albania and placed on a flight to Germany. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 5. Upon
his arrival in Germany, EI-Masri promptly related the events to an attorney who reported to German
authorities. Id. Upon a preliminary investigation, German prosecutors issued arrest warrants for
unnamed CIA operatives allegedly involved in the affair (part of the investigation involved a test of
EI-Masri's hair and the results confirmed prolonged deprivation of food and presence in "a South-
Asian" country). Id.
5. See infra Part II (discussing the history, development, criticisms, and use of the state secrets
privilege). EI-Masri initiated the civil complaint against the United States in district court on
December 6, 2005. EI-Masri v. Tenet (El-Masri 1), 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 534 (E.D. Va. 2006), ajfd
sub noam. EI-Masri v. United States (El-Masri I1), 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007). EI-Masri brought
the civil complaint against then CIA Director George Tenet (acting in his individual capacity),
several corporate defendants, and unnamed CIA agents whom allegedly participated in the actual
events. El-Masri 1, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 534. Moreover, the complaint alleged that
EI-Masri had not only been held against his will, but had also been mistreated in a
number of other ways during his detention, including being beaten, drugged, bound, and
blindfolded during transport; confined in a small, unsanitary cell; interrogated several
times; and consistently prevented from communicating with anyone outside the detention
facility, including his family or the German government.
El-Masri I1, 479 F.3d at 300 (citing many of the allegations and facts found by the district court in
EI-Masri I). The United States submitted a formal claim of the state secrets privilege to the court on
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secrets from public disclosure at trial by having the case dismissed in its
entirety. 6  The district court accepted the assertion of the privilege in El-
Masri's case and ordered the case dismissed.7 Subsequently, the Fourth
Circuit affirmed.' Finally, El-Masri's pursuit of justice ended when his
words fell on deaf ears-the highest ears in the land-as the Supreme Court
denied his writ of certiorari in 2007.9 By refusing to hear the case, the Court
left El-Masri without a forum in which to attempt to prove his claims of
abduction, extraordinary rendition,' 0 and torture by the CIA.
While El-Masri's allegations seem extraordinary, lesser claims have also
been dismissed pursuant to the state secrets privilege. " This prompted
critics to allege that the government invoked the privilege far too often in
March 8, 2006. El-Masri 1, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 535; see also notes 69-71 and accompanying text
(discussing the elements for a "formal" claim of privilege). The court took a concurrent motion to
dismiss under advisement, heard oral arguments on May 12, 2006, and granted dismissal on the
same day. EI-Masri I, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 535.
6. See infra Part II.A for a brief overview of the purpose and use of the state secrets privilege.
7. "I was humiliated, I was beaten, I was drugged," claimed EI-Masri. Mears, supra note 4.
The district court responded, "the United States' motion to dismiss must be, and hereby is,
GRANTED." El-Masri I, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 541.
8. The court of appeals reluctantly recognized "the gravity of [its] conclusion that [Plaintiff]
must be denied a judicial forum for his Complaint ... and affirm[ed] the Order of the district court."
El-Masri II, 479 F.3d at 313.
9. Upon petition to the Supreme Court, E1-Masri received a one-line response: "Petition for writ
of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied." E1-Masri v. United
States, 128 S. Ct. 373 (2007) (denying certiorari from El-Masri 11, 479 F.3d 296, alleging illegal
kidnapping, rendition, torture, and interrogation of a German citizen by the CIA) (emphasis added).
A German parliamentary investigation remained underway at the time EI-Masri submitted his brief
to the Supreme Court in 2007. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 5-6. However, a
European inquiry's findings supported EI-Masri's allegations. Id.
10. The Fourth Circuit adopted the wording of EI-Masi's complaint when explaining the
concept of "extraordinary rendition":
EI-Masri alleged that his detention and interrogation were "carried out pursuant to an
unlawful policy and practice devised and implemented by defendant Tenet known as
'extraordinary rendition': the clandestine abduction and detention outside the United
States of persons suspected of involvement in terrorist activities, and their subsequent
interrogation using methods impermissible under U.S. and international laws."
El-Masri II, 479 F.3d at 300 (quoting Complaint 3, El-Masri I, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 530). The
"extraordinary rendition" program is a complex method of avoiding United States laws on torture
and interrogation. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Jurisdiction-Stripping In a Time of Terror, 95 CAL.
L. REV. 1193, 1209-11 (2007) (summary of the "extraordinary rendition" program); Tarik Abdel-
Monem, Precedent of the European Convention on Human Rights to the CIA's High Value
Detainees Program In and Through Europe, 31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 45, 45-52 (2007)
(describing the "extraordinary rendition" program and Europe's complicity in the program); Jane
Mayer, Outsourcing Torture: The Secret History of America 's "Extraordinary Rendition" Program,
The NEW YORKER, Feb. 14, 2005, at 106, 108.
11. See infra notes 14-19 and accompanying text (describing other "lesser" claims that have
been dismissed pursuant to the state secrets privilege).
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recent years due to the aggressive anti-terrorism policies of the war on
terror.12  These anti-terrorism policies often left the United States at the
defendant counsel's table answering for mistakes and unconstitutional
actions. 13  For example, the state secrets privilege prevented litigation of
claims of unconstitutional and illegal wiretapping,14 illegal firings of CIA
and executive branch whistleblowers,"5 Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) surveillance of a twelve-year-old boy, 16 discrimination at intelligence
agencies,17 and psychological operations," among others. 19
12. Louis FISHER, IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY: UNCHECKED PRESIDENTIAL POWER
AND THE REYNOLDS CASE 212 (2006) (asserting that the use of the state secrets privilege has been
"on an upward climb"); Amanda Frost, The State Secrets Privilege and Separation of Powers, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 1931, 1939 (2007) (arguing that the Bush Administration "raised the privilege in
twenty-eight percent more cases per year than in the previous decade, and ... sought dismissal in
ninety-two percent more cases per year than in the previous decade."); William G. Weaver and
Robert M. Pallitto, State Secrets and Executive Power, 120 POL. SCI. Q. 85, 85 (2005) ("Since the
administration of Jimmy Carter, there has been a sharp increase in secrecy claims by executive
branch officials .... ); contra Robert M. Chesney, State Secrets and the Limits of National Security
Litigation, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1249, 1297-99 (2007) (arguing that the privilege has not been
asserted with a significant increase recently-finding that the privilege was asserted twenty-three
times from 1981 to 1990, twenty-five times from 1991 to 2000, and twenty times from 2001 to
2006).
13. See infra notes 14-19 and accompanying text.
14. See Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1978) (upholding a dismissal under the state
secrets privilege for an action brought against the CIA, FBI, National Security Agency (NSA),
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Western Union International, RCA Global Communications,
and ITT World Communications for allegedly illegal and warrantless interceptions of international
cable, telephone, and wire transmissions of individuals and organizations who opposed the Vietnam
war).
15. See Barlow v. United States, No. 98-887X, 2000 WL 1141087 (Fed. Cl. Aug. 3, 2000)
(holding that government action withholding documents under the state secrets privilege was valid in
an action by plaintiff contesting termination from the Department of Defense (DoD) Office of Non-
Proliferation Policy as a violation of the Whistleblower Protection Act, 5 U.S.C. § 2302 (1994), even
though the plaintiff and counsel each held the requisite security clearances). Generally, the
Whistleblower Act makes it a statutory violation for the government to take personnel action against
employees because they report what they reasonably believe is a government violation of the law.
Barlow, 2000 WL 1141087, at *2.
16. See Patterson v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 893 F.2d 595 (3d Cir. 1990) (affirming
exemption of the FBI, under the state secrets privilege, from disclosure of information under a
Freedom of Information Act request by a sixth grade boy whom the FBI monitored due to a flood of
international correspondence stemming from a school project).
17. See Tilden v. Tenet, 140 F. Supp. 2d 623 (E.D. Va. 2000) (dismissing gender discrimination
claim of CIA employee under the state secrets privilege).
18. See Black v. United States, 62 F.3d 1115 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding dismissal under the state
secrets privilege valid in an action where a government contractor alleged a campaign of harassment
and psychological attack by the CIA upon reporting suspicious questioning by a Soviet
mathematician).
19. See Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 12, at 90-91. Other causes of action relating to the war on
terror include illegal imprisonment, abduction, illegal surveillance, discrimination, limitation on
public demonstrations, and wrongful termination. See, e.g., EI-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296
(4th Cir. 2007) (alleging torture, abduction, and illegal rendition); Sterling v. Tenet, 416 F.3d 338
(4th Cir. 2005) (race discrimination); BI(a)ck Tea Society v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8 (1st Cir.
216
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Each of these examples illustrates a seemingly unjust dismissal due to
the state secrets privilege. Yet the state secrets "problem" is emblematic of
a larger judicial issue which is not confined to civil cases: the tension
between the government's interest in protecting classified information and
society's interest in justice by resolution on the merits.2 0 The United States
must be allowed to prosecute terrorists, conspirators, and enemies by using
classified information as evidence. How may the government do this
without compromising the rights of the accused? Conversely, the United
States should arguably be held liable for mistakes and unconstitutional
actions resulting from aggressive anti-terrorism policies. How might the
government act as a defendant in civil actions, yet adequately protect
classified information while allowing plaintiffs some access to it for use at a
trial?
The answer might be a little known evidentiary doctrine called the
"silent witness rule."'', The rule recently received approval by Judge T. S.
Ellis in the Eastern District of Virginia.22 Under the silent witness rule, trial
participants would have copies of a classified document "key" designating
code names for classified places, names, documents, or other information.23
When referring to classified information during trial, trial participants
24
would use the code name to reference a particular piece of classified
information, thereby protecting the actual information from disclosure.25
2004) (limiting public demonstrations); Terkel v. AT&T Corp., 441 F. Supp. 2d 899 (N.D. Ill. 2006)
(illegal surveillance and disclosure of phone records); Edmonds v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 323 F.
Supp. 2d 65 (D.D.C. 2004) (illegal termination).
20. The rules of civil procedure require that defendants and plaintiffs alike must have access to
materials necessary to adequately litigate or defend their cases. See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 1-86.
Conversely, government secrets which may include the classified evidence needed to litigate a claim
are often protected from disclosure by statute. See infra Part Ill (describing the Classified
Information Procedures Act (CIPA)).
21. See infra Part IV (describing the "silent witness rule," its development, and subsequent
approval).
22. United States v. Rosen, 520 F. Supp. 2d 786, 797 n.20 (E.D. Va. 2007) (approving the silent
witness rule for use in a four minute and six second segment of recorded conversation); see infra
Part IV (discussing the development and approval of the silent witness rule).
23. Rosen, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 793-94. Although the public could still observe the trial, the key
card prohibits disclosure of the classified information. Id. The United States government proposed
the use of the silent witness rule in a handful of circumstances over the last twenty-five to thirty
years, with unclear results. See infra Part IV.B (describing the minimal attempts to implement the
silent witness rule).
24. "Trial participants" include the judge, jury, defendant, counsel for defendant, and counsel for
the prosecution or plaintiff. Rosen, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 793-94.
25. See id. For example, a defense witness might indicate his or her presence at "Airport A."
The trial participants consult the key card, which indicates "Airport A" is actually "Baghdad
International Airport." The judge, jury, defendant, and counsels would understand the witness's
The procedure allows classified evidence to be used at trial without fear of
public disclosure. 6 The approval currently extends to use in the criminal
arena, where the United States prosecutes persons for their roles in crimes
such as espionage, conspiracy, disclosing classified information, and giving
false testimony.27 This Comment hopes to address Judge Ellis's recent
judicial approval of the silent witness rule and whether its approval for use
in the criminal arena implicitly endorses its use in civil actions. 21 However,
this Comment does not suppose to analyze the practical applicability of
invoking the silent witness rule in the civil arena, but instead endeavors to
present the information necessary to understand this new doctrine.
Part II will acquaint the reader as to the history of the state secrets
privilege and survey some of the current legal thought.2 9 Part III will
discuss the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA, or the Act), its
application to classified evidence in national security litigation, and the
government's reliance on the Act to justify the use of the silent witness
rule.3 ° Part IV will address the preliminary case law history of the silent
witness rule,3t culminating with an analysis of Judge Ellis's opinion in
United States v. Rosen-arguing that his approval creates an answer to the
state secrets "problem. 32 Part VI will conclude the Comment.33
II. THE STATE SECRETS "PROBLEM"
A. The State Secrets Privilege Defined
Recent history has revealed a noticeable assertion of the state secrets
privilege-an evidentiary privilege where the government moves a court to
dismiss a civil case in which the United States is a defendant or intervenor
indication, but the public would be unaware as to the actual location.
26. See infra notes 176-78 and accompanying text.
27. See Rosen, 520 F. Supp. 2d 786 (prosecution for conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act, and
aiding and abetting unauthorized disclosure of National Defense Information); United States v.
Libby, 467 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C. 2006) (prosecution for false statements to the FBI and false
testimony to a grand jury); see also United States v. Fernandez, 913 F.2d 148 (4th Cir. 1990)
(prosecution for making misrepresentations to the Inspector General of the CIA, and making false
statements to the Tower Commission); United States v. Zettl, 835 F.2d 1059 (4th Cir. 1987)
(prosecution for conspiracy, conversion, and espionage). A discussion of United States District
Court Judge T. S. Ellis's opinion approving the silent witness rule in Rosen follows in Part IV.C.
28. Civil cases do not pose the same constitutional concerns as criminal actions. See Robert E.
Stein, Revised Report II6A to the House of Delegates, 2007 A.B.A. SEC. OF INDIVIDUAL RTS. &
REsPs. 1, 8, 9, available at www.abanet.org/adminlaw/annual2007/State-Secrets-Report-Full-
HOD.pdf; see also infra Part IV.C.4.
29. See infra notes 34-130 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 131-75 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 176-254 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 255-332 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 333-39 and accompanying text.
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because litigation in open court will likely reveal state secrets or other
classified information to the public. 34  In general terms, the state secrets
privilege "protects information that would result in 'impairment of the
nation's defense capabilities, disclosure of intelligence-gathering methods or
capabilities, and disruption of diplomatic relations with foreign
governments."'' 35  The privilege can only be asserted by the head of an
executive branch agency with control over the state secret, and the agency
head may only assert the claim upon personal review of the information.36
The privilege protects classified information from disclosure and often
results in outright dismissal of any claim against the United States because
the plaintiff cannot access information essential to the claim. 37  It derived
34. In state secrets cases, the government argues that that the potential risk to national security is
too great for disclosure of classified information at trial and backs it up with a formal claim of the
privilege by the head of the agency with control of the information. Upon successful assertion of the
state secrets privilege, the court will dismiss a case due to national security dangers. See infra notes
78-81 and accompanying text (illustrating the purpose and use of the state secrets privilege).
35. Frost, supra note 12, at 1935-36 (quoting Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 57 (D.C. Cir.
1983)).
36. The claim of privilege can only be invoked through the procedural framework adopted by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953). The head of an executive agency
must assert the privilege, vowing that disclosure of sensitive information in open court would pose
such a risk to national security that the only adequate alternative is dismissal. See infra notes 62-70
and accompanying text (discussing Reynolds and the formal requirements for government assertion
of the state secrets privilege). "[Olnce the privilege is found to attach, it is absolute and cannot be
overcome by a showing of need or offsetting considerations." Chesney, supra note 12, at 1252
(citing Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11). Not only must the privilege be asserted by the government
through the head of an executive agency, but the government is the only entity that may claim the
state secrets privilege. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7-8. According to Reynolds:
The privilege belongs to the Government and must be asserted by it; it can neither be
claimed nor waived by a private party .... There must be a formal claim of privilege,
lodged by the head of the department which has control over the matter, after actual
personal consideration by that officer.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also infra note 69 and accompanying text (explaining the process for
invocation of the state secrets privilege).
37. See infra Part II.C. When the privilege attaches to particular evidence, the claimant can be
left without access to the very information that would prove the case. Therefore, courts have little
option other than to dismiss the case. Thus, the state secrets privilege is used most often to dismiss
civil cases brought against the United States, but it has been argued that the privilege could also be
used to dismiss federal criminal prosecutions by the government. See Stein, supra note 28, at 1;
Brian Z. Tamanaha, A Critical Review of the Classified Information Procedures Act, 13 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 277, 316-17 (1986) ("It follows ... that all properly classified information qualifies for the
state secrets privilege."). See also Chesney, supra note 12, at 1297-98. Chesney shows that the
government "prevailed more often than not" when seeking dismissals under the state secrets
privilege. Id. In sixty-five published opinions regarding the state secrets privilege (from 1973-
2001), "twenty-three of the twenty-eight dismissal motions were granted, as were thirty of the thirty-
seven discovery motions." Id. at 1298.
from English and American common law, finding its true beginnings in
early American court decisions on executive privilege.38
B. History and Development
American jurisprudence first mentioned the state secrets privilege
(although not by that name) during 1803 in the watershed case of Marbury v.
Madison.39  Although Marbury is widely known as the landmark case
regarding judicial review, the opinion also encompassed decisions on
evidentiary procedure. 40 The Supreme Court decision, written by Chief
Justice Marshall, suggested in dicta that Attorney General Levi Lincoln
would not have been forced to disclose information which was
communicated to him in confidence by the President of the United States.4'
38. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); see also United States v. Burr, 25 F.
Cas. 30 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14692D).
39. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 137. According to Robert M. Chesney, the Court in Marbury
was the first to allude to the privilege that would later become the "state secrets privilege." Chesney,
supra note 12, at 1271.
40. See Chesney, supra note 12, at 1271. In the course of litigating for the delivery of Marbury's
commission as Justice of the Peace, the Supreme Court addressed evidentiary concerns and the
resulting separation of powers issues. Id. Marbury sought to prove that his commission was found
in the Secretary of State's office by hearing testimony from Attorney General Levi Lincoln (who
acted as Jefferson's Secretary of State). Id. at 1271-72. Yet Attorney General Lincoln did not want
to testify as to anything he learned while acting in his official capacity as Secretary of State. Id. at
1272.
41. The Marbury Court noted that:
The [S]ecretary of [S]tate ... is also bound by the same rules of evidence. These duties
are not of a confidential nature, but are of a public kind, and his clerks can have no
exclusive privileges. There are undoubtedly facts, which may come to their knowledge
by means of their connection with the [S]ecretary of [S]tate, respecting which they cannot
be bound to answer. Such are the facts concerning foreign correspondencies, and
confidential communications between the head of the department and the President.
Mr. Lincoln, [A]ttomey [Gieneral, having been summoned, and now called, objected to
answering. He requested that the questions might be put in writing, and that he might
afterwards have time to determine whether he would answer. On the one hand he
respected the jurisdiction of this court, and on the other he felt himself bound to maintain
the rights of the executive. He was acting as [S]ecretary of [Sltate at the time when this
transaction happened. He was of opinion, and his opinion was supported by that of
others whom he highly respected, that he was not bound, and ought not to answer, as to
any facts which came officially to his knowledge while acting as [S]ecretary of [State].
Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 141-43. The aforementioned quote demonstrates Mr. Lincoln's
struggle with whether to reveal the confidential information related to him by the President, but that
upon seeking advice from trusted persons, he decided that he should not answer any questions that
would reveal the communications between himself and the President. The Court, however, found:
There was nothing confidential required to be disclosed. If there had been he was not
obliged to answer it; and if he thought that any thing was communicated to him in
confidence he was not bound to disclose it; nor was he obliged to state anything which
would criminate himself; but that the fact whether such commissions had been in the
office or not, could not be a confidential fact; it is a fact which all the world have a right
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Although this suggestion of such an evidentiary privilege was the first in a
published Supreme Court opinion, the decision failed to elaborate on the
specific application of the privilege.42
The Court revisited the issue during an evidentiary matter in the United
States v. Burr4 3 treason trial of 1807, where Aaron Burr sought production
of a letter from General James Wilkinson to the President of the United
States that purported to detail Burr's treacherous actions.44  Chief Justice
Marshall indicated that if the letter contained "any matter which it would be
imprudent to disclose, ... such matter, if it be not immediately and
essentially applicable to the point, will, of course, be suppressed. 45 The
to know.
Id. at 144-45. Chesney notes that:
Marbury had sought to elicit testimony from Attorney General Levi Lincoln-who had
been the acting Secretary of State in the opening months of the Jefferson
administration--concerning whether the commissions at issue in that case had been
found in the Secretary of State's office. Lincoln objected, arguing that he should not
testify "as to any facts which came officially to his knowledge while acting as [Slecretary
of [S]tate." Ultimately, the Court sided with Marbury, reasoning that there was nothing
confidential about the information he sought concerning the location of the commissions
at a particular point in time. The Court suggested in dicta, however, that Lincoln would
not have been "obliged" to disclose information "communicated to him in confidence."
Chesney, supra note 12, at 1271-72 (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) at 143-44).
42. Chesney, supra note 12, at 1271. Marbury's exact language stated: "If there had been
[confidential information] he was not obliged to answer it; and if he thought that any thing was
communicated to him in confidence he was not bound to disclose it." Marbury, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) at
144. The opinion failed to detail the exact application of the privilege whether the privilege
extended to confidential communications of executive branch officials, to certain confidential
information, to any actions taken by an executive officer in furtherance of their duties, or to some
combination of interactions between executive officers and confidential information or
communications. Chesney, supra note 12, at 1272.
43. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14692D).
44. Id. at 30. Chief Justice Marshall sat as a judge on the Circuit Court, although he was, at the
time, the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court. Chesney, supra note 12, at 1272 n.130.
The arguments over issuing a subpoena for production of the letter "turned more upon the propriety
of granting the motion, than upon any strictly legal question." Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 31.
On the part of the prosecution it was insisted that the subpoena was unnecessary, because
certified copies of any documents in the executive departments could be obtained by a
proper application. It was said to be improper to call upon the [P]resident to produce the
letter of Gen. Wilkinson, because it was a private letter, and probably contained
confidential communications, which the [P]resident ought not and could not be
compelled to disclose. It might contain state secrets, which could not be divulged
without endangering the national safety. It was argued that the documents demanded
could not be material to the defence, and objected that the affidavit [of Aaron Burr] did
not even state, in positive terms, that they would be material.
Id.
45. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 37.
evidentiary matter became moot, but Chief Justice Marshall curiously noted
that the prosecution did not refuse to produce the documents because
disclosure would "endanger the public safety. 46 In this way, Chief Justice
Marshall signaled the existence of an evidentiary privilege that could
suppress evidence concerning public safety.47 Chief Justice Marshall's
comments remain important for the "introduction of the notion that risk to
public safety might impact the discoverability of information held by the
government., 48  Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Burr foreshadowed the
importance of public safety and classified information that would codify the
modem state secrets privilege, but the Court did not speak on the subject
again until 1875, sixty-eight years later.49
Yet the absence of published American decisions on the evidentiary
privilege did not stifle the increasing scholarship and development of the
privilege. 50 By way of example, Robert M. Chesney cites the American
edition of Thomas Starkie's English evidence law treatise and its "public
policy" and "state policy" privilege.51 Starkie asserted that "[t]here are
some instances ... where the law excludes particular evidence, not because
in its own nature it is suspicious or doubtful, but on grounds of public
policy, and because greater mischief and inconvenience would result from
the reception than from the exclusion of such evidence., 52  Additionally,
Starkie included in his writings another category of privilege rooted in
"grounds of state policy," where evidence should be excluded from use
because its disclosure would be "prejudicial to the community. 53
46. Id. "There is certainly nothing before the court which shows that the letter in question
contains any matter the disclosure of which would endanger the public safety." Id.
47. See id.
48. Chesney, supra note 12, at 1273. Thomas Starkie's "state policy" privilege stemmed from
three distinct English privileges. Id. at 1274. The "informer's privilege" shielded communications
between government officials and their confidential informants. Id. at 1274. The deliberative
process privilege shielded certain government communications that are used in intra-governmental
discussions and operations. Id. The third and most pertinent English privilege provided that some
factual information could be kept from public disclosure based on security grounds. Id. This
"security privilege" flowed from an 1817 English decision, Rex v. Watson, 171 Eng. Rep. 591, 604
(K.B. 1817), concerning an alleged plot to overthrow the British Government where a Tower of
London employee was not allowed to testify as to the accuracy of a map of the Tower found in the
conspirators' possession. Chesney, supra note 12, at 1274-75.
49. The Burr decision in 1807 was the last reference to the evidentiary privilege until Totten v.
United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875). Chesney, supra note 12, at 1273, 1277.
50. See Chesney, supra note 12, at 1273-77. British treatises continued to develop evidence law,
and some of these treatises published American editions with citations to American law when
possible. Id. at 1273.
51. Id. at 1273-75.
52. Id. at 1273-74 (quoting THOMAS STARKIE, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE AND DIGEST OF PROOFS IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS, § LXXVI at 103 (Boston,
Wells and Lilly 1826)).
53. Chesney, supra note 12, at 1274.
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Development of the privilege continued, through the first evidence treatise
written from an American perspective, up until the publication of the first of
two Supreme Court cases that construed the new privilege into what is now
known as the modem state secrets privilege. 4
The modem formulation of the state secrets privilege flows from two
cases: Totten v. United States,55 and United States v. Reynolds.5 6 Totten, in
1875, involved the estate of a Union spy and its attempt to enforce a
purported contract with President Abraham Lincoln.57 The estate alleged
that the government only reimbursed Totten for expenses incurred during the
exercise of duties and failed to pay the full contract salary. 58 Affirming
dismissal by the Court of Claims, the Supreme Court found that the "secrecy
which such contracts impose precludes any action for their enforcement. ' 59
The Court stated that, as a general principle, a court of justice cannot hear
matters where trial would lead to the disclosure of information where the
law prohibits such disclosure.6 °  Cases involving government secrets fall
54. Id. at 1276-77. Chesney states that Harvard Law School Professor Simon Greenleaf's
treatise, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence (7th ed. 1854), is arguably the first major treatise of
evidence law published from an explicitly American perspective. Chesney, supra note 12, at 1276-
77.
55. 92 U.S. 105 (1875).
56. 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
57. See Totten, 92 U.S. at 105-06. The facts, as found by the Court, were as follows:
The action was brought to recover compensation for services alleged to have been
rendered by the claimant's intestate, William A. Lloyd, under a contract with President
Lincoln, made in July, 1861, by which he was to proceed South and ascertain the number
of troops stationed at different points in the insurrectionary States, procure plans of forts
and fortifications, and gain such other information as might be beneficial to the
government of the United States, and report the facts to the President; for which services
he was to be paid $200 a month.
Id.
58. Id. at 106.
59. Id. at 107.
60. Id. The Court placed government secrets at the same level of protection as utterances in a
confessional, attorney-client communications, or physician's privilege.
It may be stated as a general principle, that public policy forbids the maintenance of any
suit in a court of justice, the trial of which would inevitably lead to the disclosure of
matters which the law itself regards as confidential, and respecting which it will not allow
the confidence to be violated. On this principle, suits cannot be maintained which would
require a disclosure of the confidences of the confessional, or those between husband and
wife, or of communications by a client to his counsel for professional advice, or of a
patient to his physician for a similar purpose. Much greater reason exists for the
application of the principle to cases of contract for secret services with the government,
as the existence of a contract of that kind is itself a fact not to be disclosed.
Id. The Court further noted that the publicity of the secret contract would itself be a breach of that
contract, and thus precluded recovery. Id.
especially within this category because such secrets are often protected by
statute.6' Totten clarified the instances where the privilege would be
applicable, but a procedure for officially invoking the privilege still did not
exist.
Reynolds, however, provides the modem framework for invocation of
the state secrets privilege.62 In the three Reynolds actions, widows of
several service men that died in a plane crash while testing secret electronics
equipment sued the government under the Federal Tort Claims Act.63  In
district court, the government resisted production of the accident report on
the grounds that "the investigation board report and survivors' statements
could not be furnished without seriously hampering national security, flying
safety, and the development of highly technical and secret military
equipment." 64  The district court denied the government's assertions of
privilege and instead ordered production. 65 The district court issued another
order finding for the plaintiffs on the issue of liability when the government
failed to produce the report.66 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit found that "[s]tate secrets of a diplomatic or military nature have
always been privileged from disclosure in any proceeding," but that the
decision of the district court denying the government's claim of privilege did
61. See Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 1-16 (1980) (prescribing
methods for protecting classified information from public disclosure).
62. Chesney, supra note 12, at 1283.
63. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1,2 (1953). Originally enacted in 1946, the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA) waives sovereign immunity and subjects the United States to liability for some
tort claims. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671 et seq. (2000). Prior to the FTCA, the only remedy
available for the tortious acts of federal employees was to file a private bill with the United States
Congress. Frank Hanley Santoro, A Practical Guide to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 63 CONN. B.J.
224, 224 (1989).
64. Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987, 990 (3d Cir. 1951), rev'd, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
Initially, the government did not resist production of the accident report based on the still ephemeral
state secrets privilege, but because the Secretary of the Air Force "determined that it would not be in
the public interest to furnish this report of investigation as requested by counsel in this case." Id.
The letter from the Secretary, describing the reasoning for non-production, went on:
This report was prepared under regulations which are designed to insure the collection of
all pertinent information regarding aircraft accidents ... and the optimum promotion of
flying safety. Because this matter is one of such primary importance to the Air Force, it
has been found necessary to restrict the use of aircraft accident reports to the official
purpose for which they are intended. Under our regulations, this type of report is not
available in courts-martial proceedings or other forms of disciplinary action or in the
determination of pecuniary liability.
It is hoped that the extreme importance which the Department of the Air Force
places upon the confidential nature of its official aircraft accident reports will be fully
appreciated and understood by your Honorable Court.
Id. at 990 (internal quotation marks omitted).
65. Id. at 990-91.
66. Id. at 991.
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not contain error meriting reversal.67 Chief Justice Vinson, writing for the
Supreme Court, reversed and held that "where necessity is dubious, a formal
claim of privilege, made under the circumstances of this case, will have to
prevail. 68 Chief Justice Vinson articulated a set of formal criteria that must
be met for a valid assertion of the privilege, requiring the head of the
executive agency with control of the information to: (1) assert the privilege,
(2) personally review the information to determine applicability, and (3)
lodge a formal claim of privilege with the court if the agency head
determines the privilege applies. 69 The Supreme Court effectively endorsed
the state secrets privilege and indicated that absent evidence to the contrary,
a court is obliged to accept the government's assertion of the privilege.7 °
Although the Court was helpful in articulating formal criteria for
asserting the privilege, Chief Justice Vinson required significantly less
review of the evidence than mandated by the courts below. Importantly,
Chief Justice Vinson modified the Third Circuit's requirement of automatic
"ex parte" and "in camera" review of the evidence in determining
application of the privilege. 71 He instead determined that the government
67. Id. at 996. The court further noted that the judiciary is competent to determine whether the
evidence is subject to the privilege through examination of the evidence in camera and ex parte. Id.
at 997; see also infra note 71 and accompanying text (defining "in camera" and "ex parte").
68. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 (1953). Fred Vinson was the thirteenth Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, nominated by President Harry Truman in 1946. JAN PALMER, THE
VINSON COURT ERA: THE SUPREME COURT'S CONFERENCE VOTES 6 (1990).
69. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7-8. According to the Court:
The privilege belongs to the Government and must be asserted by it; it can neither be
claimed nor waived by a private party. It is not to be lightly invoked. There must be a
formal claim of privilege, lodged by the head of the department which has control over
the matter, after actual personal consideration by that officer. The court itself must
determine whether the circumstances are appropriate for the claim of privilege, and yet
do so without forcing a disclosure of the very thing the privilege is designed to protect.
Id.
70. See id. at 11.
71. See id. at 10. Chief Justice Vinson stated:
[W]e will not go so far as to say that the court may automatically require a complete
disclosure to the judge before the claim of privilege will be accepted in any case. It may
be possible to satisfy the court, from all the circumstances of the case, that there is a
reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters which, in
the interest of national security, should not be divulged.
Id. Later in the opinion, Chief Justice Vinson applied this rule, and found that "[tihere is nothing to
suggest that the electronic equipment, in this case, had any causal connection with the accident." Id.
at 11. "Ex parte" examinations consist of only the court and one party, without notice to or
arguments from the adverse party. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 616 (8th ed. 2004). "In camera"
proceedings take place in the judge's private chambers, in the courtroom with all spectators
excluded, or when the court is not in session. Id. at 775.
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must not always present the evidence to the court for review, but first a court
must apply the deferential "reasonable danger" test to determine whether
further inquiry is necessary.72 Under this test, a court looks at the context of
the case in deciding whether "there is a reasonable danger that compulsion
of the evidence" will disclose information that would harm national
security.73 Chief Justice Vinson attempted to fashion a compromise between
the need for the court to keep some information secret and leaving a court
with the ability to check the executive.74
Many years later, once the government declassified the Reynolds
accident report, it became clear that it did not contain any information about
the secret electronic equipment. 75  Herein lies the primary point of agitation
for those who oppose the current use of the state secrets privilege-had the
court reviewed the documents, it would have been clear that the state secrets
privilege was not applicable.76 This example alone demonstrates the
72. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10 ("When this is the case, the occasion for the privilege is
appropriate, and the court should not jeopardize the security which the privilege is meant to protect
by insisting upon an examination of the evidence, even by the judge alone, in chambers.").
73. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10. Vinson believed that it would sometimes be obvious from the
mere context of the case that a reasonable danger was present. Chesney, supra note 12, at 1286. In
such cases, reviewing information in camera or ex parte would increase the danger of disclosure and
should not be done. Id. at 1287. According to Chesney, the reasonable danger test left open several
questions for consideration. Id. For example, how deferential should the court be to the claims of
privilege by the government? Id. When the information is necessary a court should not accept the
claim of privilege lightly, but the court would still be deferential to any claim of privilege. Id.
Following his "reasonable danger" test, Chief Justice Vinson was satisfied that "there was a
reasonable danger that the accident investigation report would contain references to the secret
electronic equipment which was the primary concern of the mission." Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10.
74. See Christopher D. Yamaoka, The State Secrets Privilege: What's Wrong With It, How It Got
That Way, and How the Courts Can Fix It, HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 139, 155-56 (2007) (discussing
in broad terms the problems with the state secrets privilege).
75. See FISHER, supra note 12, at 166-69. Several of the original plaintiffs in Reynolds
attempted to get access to the accident report through Freedom of Information Act requests in 1991.
Id. at 165. Each time they requested the report, the government fulfilled the request but sent the
document's redacted version. Id. Finally, in 2000, the daughter of one of the crash victims
requested and received the full and un-redacted accident report, declassified in 1996, and distributed
it to the other victim's families. Id. at 166-67. Upon seeing the declassified accident report, the
family was shocked to see that "what 'had been blacked out all those years ago was not government
secrets, but the names of those who had been at fault."' Id. at 166. On March 4, 2003, the families
petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of error coram nobis. Id. at 176. Such a writ allows parties
to petition a court to "review and correct its judgment because it was based on error of fact." Id. at
169. According to the Reynolds families, an error of fact occurred because the government asserted
that the accident report contained secret military information when it turned out the reports
"include[d] nothing approaching a 'military secret."' Id. at 177. On June 23, 2003, the Supreme
Court denied the petition to file a writ of error coram nobis. In re Herring, 539 U.S. 940 (2003). In
October of 2003 the Reynolds families started over at district court, seeking relief from fraud
perpetrated upon the court. FISHER, supra note 12, at 188. The district court found for the
government, the Third Circuit agreed, and the Supreme Court again denied certiorari. Id. at 197,
207,211.
76. Chesney, supra note 12, at 1288. The report at issue did not contain information about the
classified equipment aboard the Reynolds flight. Id. "Had the Supreme Court permitted the district
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fundamental error in Reynolds, its subsequent application, and illustrates the
controversy over the state secrets privilege. "
C. State Secrets Controversy
When the government asserts the state secrets privilege, a civil action
brought against the United States may be subject to outright dismissal,
depriving the litigant of a venue to prove the merits of the action.7" In such
a situation, the government is unwilling to risk disclosure of classified
information (or even acknowledge existence of such information) and
refuses to produce the necessary documentary evidence for use at trial.79
Moreover, the United States usually invokes the state secrets privilege when
acting as a defendant in a civil action.80 However, the state secrets privilege
might also be used in a criminal trial where a defendant seeks discovery of
classified information for use in a defense.8' The American people are
either deprived of the ability to prosecute and convict a criminal defendant-
possibly a defendant involved in espionage or terrorism against the United
States--or a civil plaintiff is deprived of a remedy for alleged wrongdoings.
judge to conduct an in camera, ex parte review of the report, the judge presumably would have
discovered this fact." id.
77. See id. at 1288. Chesney is careful to note that subsequent courts have been careful to avoid
the Reynolds error in that they ensure the proffered evidence actually contains classified information.
Id. at 1289.
78. See id. at 1252 (citing United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953)); see also supra note 36
and accompanying text. Not only will the state secrets privilege have bearing on a civil claim
against the United States, but it will affect the outcome of criminal prosecutions.
The privilege affects litigation in at least three different ways. First, it can bar evidence
from admission in the litigation. The plaintiffs case will then go forward without the
barred evidence, and will be dismissed only if the plaintiff is unable to prove the prima
facie elements of the claim without it. Second, if the privilege deprives the defendant of
information that would provide a valid defense, then the court may grant summary
judgment for the defendant. And third, "notwithstanding the plaintiffs ability to produce
nonprivileged evidence, if the 'very subject matter of the action' is a state secret, then the
court should dismiss the plaintiff's action based solely on the invocation of the state
secrets privilege."
Frost, supra note 12, at 1937 (internal citation omitted); see also Brian M. Tomney, Contemplating
the Use of Classified or State Secret Information Obtained Ex Parte on the Merits in Civil
Litigation: Bl(a)ck Tea Society v. City of Boston, 57 ME. L. REV. 641, 649 (2005).
79. See generally FISHER, supra note 12, at 212-52.
80. See Stein, supra note 28, at 1.
81. See Tomney, supra note 78, at 650; Stein, supra note 28, at 8-9; Tamanaha, supra note 37, at
316-17.
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1. The American Bar Association Call for Action
The American Bar Association (ABA), among other groups, recently
called on Congress to enact legislation that deals with problems inherent in
the current use of the state secrets privilege.82 The ABA Section of
Individual Rights and Responsibilities and the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York submitted a report and recommendation to the ABA
House of Delegates in August of 2007, outlining the state secrets problem
and possible solutions.83  As the government is the only party that may
assert the state secrets privilege, the report and recommendation called for
legislative action, and urged the judiciary to act as an independent check on
government assertions of the privilege.84
2. Current Thoughts on State Secrets
There already exists a plethora of academic literature espousing the
shortcomings of the state secrets privilege in its current form.85 This
Comment does not suppose to repeat what more versed and eloquent writers
have already exposed. The possible problems and alleged current misuses
86
82. See Stein, supra note 28, at 1. The American Bar Association supports legislation or judicial
scrutiny, which assures that "federal civil cases are not dismissed based solely on the state secrets
privilege." Id. (emphasis added). "[1]n furtherance of this objective the American Bar Association
urges Congress to enact legislation governing federal civil cases implicating the state secrets
privilege (including cases in which the government is an original party or an intervenor) . I..." Id.
83. See generally id.
84. See id. at 1.
85. See Yamaoka, supra note 74, at 156; see also infra notes 87-130 and accompanying text
(relating the shortcomings of the state secrets privilege).
86. Some argue that the use of the privilege increased during the administration of President
George W. Bush. See, e.g., Frost, supra note 12, at 1938. Frost cites other authors' contentions that
the Bush Administration used the privilege with greater frequency than previous generations.
But starting in 1977, the executive raised the privilege with greater frequency ...
Scholars debate whether the Bush Administration's assertion of the state secrets privilege
differs from past practice. Several contend that it does, claiming that the executive is
now raising the privilege with far greater frequency and is using it to obtain outright
dismissals rather than simply to limit discovery.
Id. Frost concludes that "[tihe Bush Administration has raised the privilege in twenty-eight percent
more cases per year than in the previous decade, and has sought dismissal in ninety-two percent
more cases per year than in the previous decade." Id. at 1939. Other authors agree in principle,
citing their own numbers. "Indeed, recent cases indicate that Bush Administration lawyers are using
the privilege with offhanded abandon. In one case, DOJ attorneys raised the privilege on 245
separate occasions .... " Weaver and Pallitto, supra note 12, at 109.
Others argue that the United States seeks dismissal on state secrets grounds at nearly the same
rate as previous decades. See Chesney, supra note 12, at 1249, 1301. "The available data do
suggest that the privilege has continued to play an important role during the Bush [Aidministration,
but it does not support the conclusion that the Bush [Aldministration chooses to resort to the
privilege with greater frequency than prior administrations or in unprecedented substantive
contexts." Id. at 1301. Either way, the literature debating the use of the state secrets privilege is
prevalent. See supra notes 12, 28, 36, 78, and infra note 121; see also David Kay and Michael
228
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of the privilege have been well discussed, but for the reader's benefit, some
of the current thoughts on the state secrets privilege are discussed below.
One critic views the state secrets privilege as an attack on democratic
accountability and suggests a new system of courts to deal with classified
civil trials. 87 Another believes the privilege works directly against the rights
of private citizens and suggests that the government should be forced to lose
any case where the state secrets privilege is invoked.88 Still others disagree
regarding how to deal with the issue, whether through Congress, the
judiciary, or some other already existing rules or regulations.89 One thing is
clear-critics agree that the state secrets privilege presents a real problem in
need of a solution.
Robert M. Chesney, for example, criticizes the judicial treatment of El-
Masri v. Tenet9° and the court's application of the Reynolds' "reasonable
danger" test. 9' The government asserted the state secrets privilege upon the
commencement of El-Masri's civil complaint pursuant to the United States'
"extraordinary rendition program" and fulfilled each of the Reynolds'
formalities. 92  The district court found that the government met all the
requirements for the privilege and dismissed the case; subsequently, the
Fourth Circuit affirmed under the holding in Reynolds.93  Chesney argues
that El-Masri demonstrates how the state secrets privilege conflicts with
democratic accountability and enforcement of the rule of law. 94  Although
government secrecy is necessary in some circumstances, it comes with a
German, Abusing the Secrets Shield, WASH. POST, June 18, 2007, at A17 (calling for independent
judicial review of the evidence in state secrets cases); Scott Shane, Invoking Secrets Privilege
Becomes a More Popular Legal Tactic by U.S., N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2006, at Al (asserting that the
state secrets privilege has been used more under the administration of George W. Bush than any
presidential administration); Stein, supra note 28.
87. See Chesney, supra note 12, at 1249.
88. See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
89. See Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 12, at 86 (2005). But see Chesney, supra note 12; Frost,
supra note 12, at 1958.
90. EI-Masri v. Tenet (El-Masri 1), 437 F. Supp. 2d 530 (E.D. Va. 2006), aff'd sub nom. El-
Masri v. United States (EI-Masri 11), 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 373 (2007).
91. El-Masri II, 479 F.3d at 307; see also Chesney, supra note 12, at 1249.
92. El-Masri 1, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 537. El-Masri revolved around the United States'
"extraordinary rendition" program where the government allegedly transferred a terrorist suspect of
German citizenship to a foreign location for questioning by "unscrupulous" methods. Chesney,
supra note 12, at 1255; see also supra Part I (describing El-Masri in detail). The govemment
satisfied the formal privilege elements. EI-Masri 1, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 537. "There must be a formal
claim of privilege, lodged by the head of the department which has control over the matter, after
actual personal consideration by that officer." United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1953).
93. El-Masri 11, 479 F.3d at 299.
94. See Chesney, supra note 12, at 1266.
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cost-injury to the democratic process and government accountability to its
citizens.95 El-Masri, for example, was deprived of the ability to "attempt to
establish even the legal sufficiency of his claims, a harm that arguably is
experienced by the larger public as well., 96  The question remains: How
may we protect secret government information without depriving civil
litigants of their day in court? Aside from an obvious change from the ultra-
deferential standard in Reynolds, Chesney proposes another possible
solution. 97  He suggests a court system similar to the current Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Courts (FISC). 98 Here, Congress could authorize
judges to transfer cases to a specially created court that would hold non-
public proceedings rather than dismiss the action on state secrets grounds. 99
At least, Chesney suggests, Article III judges would hear the cases-
admittedly in camera and "on a permanently sealed, bench-trial basis."' °
Although this suggestion is a step in the right direction, Chesney himself
believes the suggestion is "far from ideal."' 0'1 Indeed, such a suggestion
utilizes a model already in practice (the FISC) and so it provides a concrete
process to follow. Yet the specially created courts do not address the
public's aversion to secrecy and will not likely convince the public that
justice is being served.
Louis Fisher believes that the privilege is unnecessary and contradictory
to the rights of private American citizens.'02 He suggests that the judiciary
95. Id. Many argue that the Bush Administration has used the privilege too many times-cutting
off legitimate litigation before it starts. Id. at 1306-07. Chesney also argues that the administration
has not drastically increased the use of the privilege, but that the government has been seeking
dismissal of cases under this privilege, with relative frequency, since the 1970s. Id. at 1307.
96. Id. at 1266. Moreover, Chesney notes that no United States citizen has brought a case
against the government for extraordinary rendition. Id. at 1266. Chesney challenges his reader to
imagine a situation where a citizen was denied the ability to even attempt to prove his or her case.
Id. at 1266-67. This scenario demonstrates the reason for the heated academic criticism of the
privilege. Id.
97. Id. at 1311.
98. Id. at 1313. In 1978, Congress enacted the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) to
deal with a peculiar problem: the government needed to conduct surveillance operations of foreign
targets in order to thwart terrorist attacks, but such surveillance would only be admissible in
domestic court if conducted under the authority of a warrant attained pursuant to probable cause that
a crime had already been committed. See John C. Yoo, Judicial Review and the War on Terrorism,
72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 427, 441-42 (2003). The government wanted a way to conduct surveillance
that would be admissible in domestic court, conducted per a warrant based on evidence of a crime
that had not yet been committed. Id. at 442. Congress, through FISA, established the FISC and
empowered it to issue warrants for surveillance of a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.
Id. In pertinent part, FISA proceedings are held ex parte and the government is the only party
present so that classified information can be discussed openly without the fear of public disclosure.
Id. at 442-43.
99. See Chesney, supra note 12, at 1313.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1314.
102. See generally FISHER, supra note 12.
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should look at evidence in camera to assure that a relationship exists
between the evidence and national security concerns. 10 3  In such a
circumstance, a judge must be willing to challenge the determination of the
head of an executive department. 10 4  Instead of a deferential standard, the
privilege should be regarded as qualified rather than absolute so that it may
be subject to adversarial scrutiny.0 5 In the alternative, Fisher suggests that
the government should be forced to lose the case if it elects to assert the
privilege. 10 6  From his perspective, the government has nothing to lose in
asserting the privilege and must be put to the test-assert the privilege and
103. Id. at 253-54. In describing a solution to the state secrets "problem," Fisher responds to
Chief Justice Vinson's treatment of United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
The logical answer would be for a court to look at the documents in camera to assure that
the department's judgment was on reasonable grounds. Judicial scrutiny of the
documents might reveal that the official would not have personally considered the
affidavit, because the documents had no remote relationship to national security or
military secrets.
FISHER, supra note 12, at 253-54.
104. FISHER, supra note 12, at 254. Judges must be willing to challenge the determinations of the
executive official lodging the claim of privilege with the court, whether through in camera review or
other judicial scrutiny. Id. Fisher claims that the Supreme Court's flawed analysis in Reynolds ties
the hands of the judiciary. Id. Chief Justice Vinson's opinion in Reynolds does not describe how the
judiciary can hold executive officials accountable while protecting "the legitimate rights of private
citizens to gain access to needed documents." Id. Chief Justice Vinson's proclamation that courts
determine the privilege's applicability from "'from all the evidence' is qualified by the mandate to
"'not jeopardize the security which the privilege is meant to protect.' Id. at 254-55 (quoting
Reynolds, 345 U.S at 9-10). Fisher looks to Chief Justice Vinson's opinion as circular in reasoning,
requiring deference to the executive determination of the privilege's applicability while also
requiring the judiciary to assess the presence of a "reasonable danger" to national security "without
requiring further disclosure." Id. at 256. Such flawed reasoning results in nearly certain deference
to the executive head's affidavit. Id.
Litigants have little reason in such cases to expect judges to exercise the independence
they claim to possess. In such cases, the courtroom is not a place where the private
litigant has a fighting chance. The private party is pitted against two superior forces: the
executive branch joined with the judiciary.
Id. at 257.
105. "The state secrets privilege must be regarded as qualified, not absolute. Otherwise there is
no adversary process in court, no exercise of judicial independence over what evidence is needed,
and no fairness accorded to private litigants who challenge the government." FISHER, supra note 12,
at 257. Instead of deference to the executive, Congress and the judiciary should adopt a skeptical
approach to executive claims of secrecy. Id. The Reynolds case indicates that the government does
not merit deference because its state secrets assertion of privilege turned out to be false. Id.; see also
supra notes 68-77 and accompanying text (discussing Reynolds and its allegedly flawed holding).
106. FISHER, supra note 12, at 257. If the government asserts the state secrets privilege because
the requested information is vital to United States national security concerns, then "a fair resolution
would be for the courts to decide in the plaintiffs favor, as the district court and the Third Circuit
did in Reynolds." Id. (discussing Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987, 991, 998 (3d Cir. 1951),
rev'd, 345 U.S. 1 (1953)).
be willing to lose the case. 10 7  "Disposing of a case in that manner may
reward plaintiffs who have unproven cases, but it also puts the government
on notice that asserting state secrets comes at a price."' °8 Here, however, it
could easily be argued that the public loses, rather than wins. Such a
scenario could indeed create extraordinary monetary burdens for the
judiciary and the tax base alike. Under such a plan, any former government
employee with a piece of particularly sensitive classified information could
win an uncontested monetary judgment. However, Fisher steadfastly
believes that the government should be forced to pay a hefty price for
keeping a necessary secret. 109
William G. Weaver and Robert M. Pallitto argue that the privilege
obstructs the judiciary's constitutional duty to oversee the executive. "0 The
American system of government, with open checks and balances on each of
the three branches of government, provides a "powerful argument[] for
judicial oversight of executive branch action even if national security is
involved." "' According to Weaver and Pallitto, "[t]he privilege, as now
employed, is tantamount to courts capitulating in their oversight function"
and failing in the constitutional duty to balance the other branches of
government.l12 Moreover, the state secrets privilege erodes the
107. FISHER, supra note 12, at 257. Finding for the plaintiff when the government asserts the
privilege puts the government on notice that state secrets privilege assertions come with significant
cost. Id. "That principle is understood in criminal proceedings. If the government refuses to release
documents needed by the defendant, it must agree to drop the case. The accused goes free." Id.
108. Id.
109. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
110. See generally Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 12, at 86. "Despite frequent involvement by
Congress in issues concerning executive secrecy, most challenges to refusals to disclose information
are handled in the courts, and we believe that the state secrets privilege, a judicial creation, is now
judicially mishandled to the detriment of our constitutional system." Id.
11. Id. at 89-90. Such a liberal and democratic country as the United States is defined by the
oversight and accountability provided by the balance of power. Indeed, Weaver and Pallitto advance
"powerful arguments for judicial oversight of executive branch action even if national security is
involved." Id. at 90. They argue that allowing executive agencies to violate the constitutional rights
of United States citizens without judgment in open court is contrary to the rule of law. Id. Further,
the mere existence of the privilege enables executive agencies to abuse it because it protects the
agency from judicial oversight. The executive will be tempted to use the privilege to "avoid
embarrassment, to handicap political enemies, and to prevent criminal investigation of
administrative action." Id. Perhaps most convincingly, Weaver and Pallitto argue that the state
secrets privilege impedes on the judiciary's constitutional duty to provide oversight of the executive.
Id. They ably summarize their concerns regarding the state secrets privilege: "Although the
privilege is crucial to national security, it is also a bane to constitutional government, and we believe
that the judiciary must carefully and selectively exercise oversight of administrators to prevent abuse
of the citizenry and the Constitution and the weakening of the rule of law." Id.
112. Id. at 90. The deference to executive assertions of the privilege is a dangerous precedent
emanating from the Reynolds case. Id. at 102-03. Judicial deference may tempt the executive to
violate constitutional rights of citizens, knowing that asserting the privilege will eliminate the
possible disclosure of such violations. Id. at 103. Compounding the problem, the court's refusal to
test the executive "double[s] the damage by refusing to impose costs on the executive branch for its
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Constitution's role as the supreme law of the land; it places remarkable
power in the hands of the executive because the judiciary nearly always
grants the government's invocation of the state secrets privilege. 1 3 The
executive abuses the privilege at the expense of an open and democratic
society, while the judiciary and Congress sit idly by. 114
Amanda Frost initially argues that courts should be reluctant to dismiss
cases when the executive is seeking to prevent review of constitutional
challenges to specific executive programs." 5  If such judicial restraint is
unsuccessful or impossible, courts should have the option of foregoing
jurisdiction and transferring oversight back to Congress." 6  According to
Frost, Congress already "checks" executive actions through oversight
hearings, impeachment proceedings, power of the purse, and enactment of
new law. 117 It should not be a stretch for Congress to effect oversight of the
state secrets privilege through the same mechanisms. "8 Only when the
judiciary is satisfied that Congress is effectively policing the executive
should the judiciary willingly dismiss cases under the executive assertion of
the state secrets privilege." 9  Finally, Frost asserts that if neither of the
aforementioned solutions can be successfully implemented, the judiciary
must stand up and challenge the executive on its assertions of privilege. 
120
breaches [of the Constitution]." Id.
113. See id. at 86-87, 111-12. The current state of the privilege "virtually guarantees that its
assertion in any particular case will be successful," id. at 11, and therefore the executive loses
nothing, not even resources, by asserting the privilege. Id. at 86, 111 ("At present, it is costless for
the president to assert a privacy privilege .....
114. Seeid. atlll-12.
115. See Frost, supra note 12, at 1958. Congress delegated oversight power to the federal
judiciary; courts should not be so quick to refuse this oversight responsibility by granting outright
dismissals based only on the executive's claim. Id. Instead, courts should take steps short of
dismissal and "attempt to respond to the executive's claim of privilege by narrowing discovery,
providing for discovery under seal, or modifying plaintiff's claims." Id. As a general matter, courts
should not dismiss cases until some discovery has occurred. Id.
116. Id. at 1959. Frost argues that Congress might be better positioned to deal with the state
secrets "problem." Id. "If a court is not the proper institution to delve into the constitutionality of
executive conduct because its inquiry would jeopardize national security, then Congress can take
over that task." Id. Congress granted the power of oversight to the judiciary in the first place,
through creation of the courts; so if the courts are not the proper forum for oversight regarding
national security, then it makes sense to return the responsibility to Congress. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See id. at 1934. Because the executive assertion of the state secrets privilege often results in
complete dismissal, courts should only do so if Congress is actively engaging in effective oversight
through hearings, legislation, or other means of balancing the executive. See id.
120. Id. at 1962-63. Congress might not accept the transfer of oversight from the judiciary. Id. at
1962. "If Congress appears unwilling or unable to inquire into the legality of executive conduct,
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Professor D. A. Jeremy Telman reacts to the pre-discovery dismissal of
actions when allegations have already been exposed through press reports or
acknowledged by the government.' 2 ' Telman believes that "courts have
transformed the [p]rivilege into a new and extraordinarily expansive doctrine
of executive immunity" through a confusion of the language in Totten and
Reynolds. 122  He opposes congressional oversight of the privilege because
Congress does not have a good track record of opposing the executive,
especially during times of war. l2 3  Moreover, Telman states that Congress
has been unwilling to pass legislation that would fix abuses of the
privilege. 124 The only way to truly fix the privilege is to allow the courts to
use creative solutions to protect state secrets while allowing litigants their
day in court.125 Courts could remand the entire trial for in camera
proceedings,126 appoint counsel with requisite security clearances,"' issue a
however, then the judiciary's obligation to review that conduct is all the stronger." Id.
121. See generally D.A. Jeremy Telman, Our Very Privileged Executive: Why the Judiciary Can
(and Should) Fix the State Secrets Privilege, 80 TEMP. L. REv. 499 (2007).
122. Id. at 500. At one point, the difference between the state secrets privilege as understood in
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953), and the doctrine in Totten v. United States, 92 U.S.
105 (1875), was clear. Telman, supra note 121, at 522. The state secrets privilege was meant to be
an evidentiary rule that limited discovery or precluded specific evidence from introduction at trial.
Id. The Totten doctrine immediately stops an action when the case itself would "inevitably" lead to
the disclosure of confidential information protected by law. Id. However, the two doctrines have
become intertwined such that courts dismiss cases pre-discovery under the state secrets privilege,
although "the impact of the [p]rivilege could not possibly be discerned until discovery is
completed." Id. at 523.
123. Telman, supra note 121, at 516-17. Recent history proved that Congress will not "second-
guess executive decisions relating to national security" during times of war. Id. at 516. "Congress
appears to lack the institutional will to stand up to the President in the realm of foreign affairs." Id.
at 517.
124. Id. at 516-18. Congress has not passed legislation that would restrict the executive's use of
the privilege. Telman admits that "it is hard to imagine" what a statutory solution to the state secrets
"problem" would look like. Id. at 514. Even so, Congress has the power to pass legislation that
would define and restrict the use of the privilege, and has had plenty of opportunity to do so. Id. at
516-18.
125. Id. at 521. "Reynolds left a lot of room for courts to be creative . I... Id.
126. See Halpern v. United States, 258 F.2d 36, 43 (2d Cir. 1958) (holding that a district court is
not required to hold in camera proceedings, but that it should hold such proceedings if the hearing
can be held without "serious risk of divulgence" of secrets). The court further found "that a trial in
camera in which the privilege relating to state secrets may not be availed of by the United States is
permissible, if, in the judgment of the district court, such a trial can be carried out without substantial
risk that secret information will be publicly divulged." Id. at 44; see also Telman, supra note 121, at
519-20.
127. See Al Odah v. United States, 346 F. Supp. 2d 1, 14 (D.D.C. 2004) (This is an order by the
district court requiring plaintiff's counsel to acquire necessary security clearances equal to the
classification level of evidence presented at trial, in order to represent plaintiff. The case, Al Odah v.
United States, was eventually swept into the controversy surrounding Guantanamo Bay enemy
combatant detainees and their habeas corpus petitions, resolved by the Supreme Court in
Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).). The court also noted that the government decision to
grant a security clearance "amounts to a determination that the attorney can be trusted with
information at that level of clearance" and that "there are significant statutory sanctions relating to
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protective order, or place time restrictions on the scope of the privilege 28
approaches that courts have successfully used in the past. 129 Telman asserts
that the judiciary is best poised to balance, on a case-by-case basis, the clash
between the protection of secrets and individual rights. 1
30
Whether one agrees with the aforementioned authors or not, their
commentaries allege significant problems with the state secrets privilege and
its use to dismiss civil actions. The proposed solutions are as numerous as
the perspectives on the "problem." There must be a better way to protect
national security concerns in civil actions other than outright dismissal.
III. THE CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PROCEDURES ACT
The government does not dismiss cases against federal criminal
defendants when the introduction of classified information is necessary at
trial. Instead, the government follows procedures in the Classified
Information Procedures Act (CIPA), which is pertinent to this discussion for
two reasons. First, the CIPA is the statutory mandate for dealing with
classified evidence in federal criminal prosecutions. 131  As this Comment
presents a state secrets solution through a new evidentiary doctrine called the
"silent witness rule," a close look at the CIPA is necessary because it offers
valuable insight into evidentiary rules governing classified information
methods that have already received legislative approval and judicial
application. 132 Second, the government implies that the silent witness rule is
an outgrowth of the CIPA. 113 In fact, the very idea behind the silent witness
the misuse or disclosure of classified information" which help prevent disclosure. Id.; see also
Telman, supra note 121, at 520 n.139. Moreover, the "[d]isclosure of classified information is
subject to fines, imprisonment, and loss of personal property." FISHER, supra note 12, at 228.
128. See, e.g., In re United States, 872 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (twenty-year-old secret
surveillance of a Communist Party member did not create a reasonable danger to national security);
see also Telman, supra note 121, at 521 (noting that the aforementioned case, In re United States,
demonstrates that the government has a time limit to argue that there is a reasonable danger to
national security).
129. See Telman, supra note 121, at 519-22.
130. Id. at 527.
131. The "CIPA 'was designed to establish procedures to harmonize a defendant's right to obtain
and present exculpatory material upon his trial and the government's right to protect classified
material in the national interest."' United States v. Pappas, 94 F.3d 795, 799 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting
United States v. Wilson, 571 F. Supp. 1422, 1426 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)).
132. See infra Part IV (discussing the silent witness rule).
133. It remains difficult to ascertain whether the government attempted to use the silent witness
rule as a potential document substitution under CIPA section 6 or whether the government
introduced the rule as a creation of its own. Two cases suggest, though only by implication, that the
government attempted to assert the silent witness rule as part of the CIPA. In United States v. Zetl,
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rule emanates from procedures allowed under CIPA section 6.134 Moreover,
the silent witness rule must not run afoul of CIPA procedures, or it cannot be
used at criminal trial (and thus the implication for use in the civil arena
becomes more difficult).135  Therefore, the CIPA necessitates a close
examination, beginning with its enactment and general provisions.
A. Enactment
In 1980, Congress enacted the CIPA to deal with the problem of
"graymail" in national security litigation. 136 "Graymail" refers to the
situation where a defendant threatens to disclose classified information
during the course of litigation, forcing the government to dismiss the case
rather than risk disclosure of sensitive information. 137  To combat this
problem and the resulting dismissals, Congress enacted the CIPA. 3 8 The
the government introduced the silent witness rule as an option during a CIPA section 6(c)
substitution hearing. United States v. Zettl, 835 F.2d 1062-63 (4th Cir. 1987). "At the 6(c)
substitution hearing, the district court also ruled upon the government's request for what the court
called the silent witness rule to be used at trial for the handling of classified documents." Id. at
1063. In United States v. Fernandez, the court noted that the government proposed substitutions on
July 12 pursuant to CIPA section 6(c), and revised them on July 14, 21, and 24. United States v.
Fernandez, 913 F.2d 148, 152 (4th Cir. 1990). Later, the court stated that "on July 24, the morning
of trial, the government submitted revised proposals which provided that the * * * * locations could
be referred to by a number in open court that correlated with a written key provided to the jurors
identifying the actual locations." Id. at 153; see also id. at 150 n.1 (noting that omitted classified
information is denoted as "* * * "). The July 24 revision of the proposed CIPA substitutions
asserted a tactic that meets the definition of the silent witness rule (although it was not called by that
name). Therefore, by implication, the government proposed the silent witness rule under the CIPA.
134. Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 6 (1980).
135. "The threshold question that must be resolved with respect to the [silent witness rule]'s use in
this case is whether it is even permissible to use in the CIPA context." United States v. Rosen, 520
F. Supp. 2d 786, 795 (E.D. Va. 2007).
136. Tamanaha, supra note 37, at 277. "The Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) was
enacted by Congress in 1980 to deal with the growing graymail problem. CIPA is an omnibus act
containing pretrial and trial procedures to be applied whenever classified information may be
involved in a criminal case." Id.
137. The possibility for graymail may present itself in several situations. At times, defendant and
counsel press the government for release of classified information during the discovery process,
forcing the government to produce the document or face dismissal of the action. In other situations,
the government must present classified information to make a case against the defendant. Also, the
defendant might already possess the classified information, and intend to disclose the information at
trial as part of a defense. See United States v. Pappas, 94 F.3d 795, 799 (2d Cir. 1996); Tamanaha,
supra note 37, at 277.
138. United States v. Smith, 780 F.2d 1102, 1105 (4th Cir. 1985). "CIPA was enacted by
Congress in an effort to combat the growing problem of graymail, a practice whereby a criminal
defendant threatens to reveal classified information during the course of his trial in the hope of
forcing the government to drop the criminal charge against him." Id. at 1105 (citing S. REP. No. 96-
823, at 1-2 (1980), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 4294, 4294-95).
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Act has survived judicial scrutiny and interpretation since 1980, and now is
an important mechanism for protecting classified information. 139
B. Provisions: The Act Itself
The CIPA creates an environment where the government is able to
prosecute defendants in national security cases, while protecting classified
information. 40 Even with the Act's protections, the risk of disclosure is
139. See United States v. O'Hara, 301 F.3d 563, 568 (7th Cir. 2002).
CIPA's plain terms evidence Congress's intent to protect classified information from
unnecessary disclosure at any stage of a criminal trial. Any other interpretation would be
wholly inconsistent with and threaten to undermine CIPA's fundamental purpose-
protecting and restricting the discovery of classified information in a way that does not
impair the defendant's right to a fair trial.
Id. Although the CIPA's constitutionality has been challenged on many occasions, it has survived
such challenges because courts construe the CIPA as a rule of evidence that does not seek to
establish new rules regarding admissibility. As one commentator notes:
Defendants have unsuccessfully used the [F]ifth [A]mendment due process guarantees to
defeat CIPA protective orders or evidentiary rulings regarding classified information.
Instead, the courts have relied on the evidentiary standards of the federal rules or
common law doctrines to exclude proffered evidence .... Again, using the federal rules,
the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Anderson commented that a defendant's right to
present a full and complete defense is not compromised by the requirement that he
comply with the established rules of procedure and evidence. In other words, a criminal
defendant's right to present a full defense and to receive a fair trial does not entitle him to
place before the jury evidence normally inadmissible. In reviewing constitutional
challenges made by the defendant, courts have consistently relied on the established rules
of evidence and related case law, claiming that CIPA does not undertake to create new
substantive law governing admissibility.
Timothy J. Shea, CIPA Under Siege: The Use and Abuse of Classified Information in Criminal
Trials, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 657, 675-76 (1990) (internal quotations omitted).
140. The "CIPA establishes several procedures to minimize the risk of graymail and to adjust the
competing interests of the Government in maintaining its secrets and of the defendant in mounting
an effective defense." Pappas, 94 F.3d at 799. In order to determine the scope and application of
the CIPA, the Act first defines both "classified information" and "national security":
(a) 'Classified information', as used in this Act, means any information or material that
has been determined by the United States Government pursuant to an Executive order,
statute, or regulation, to require protection against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of
national security ....
(b) 'National security', as used in this Act, means the national defense and foreign
relations of the United States.
Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § l(a)-(b) (1980). The CIPA also protects
against disclosure of "restricted data" as defined in paragraph (r) of section 11 of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. § 2014(y) (1954)). Id.
The definitions of "classified information" and "national security" were subject to
constitutional attack in United States v. Wilson, 571 F. Supp. 1422 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). The defendant
argued that the terms were vague, thus rendering the CIPA void. Id. at 1426. He maintained that,
sometimes too great for the United States to prosecute defendants.
Moreover, inherent within the CIPA's mechanisms lay the conflict between
the Sixth Amendment right to public trial and the government's need to
protect sensitive information by closing parts of trials to public view.14' The
CIPA outlines specific procedures that a court must follow when the use of
classified information is necessary in federal criminal prosecutions.' 42 The
Act offers procedures designed to protect the secrecy of the classified
information used at such trials, while allowing the trial to move forward. 1
43
In the words of one court, the "CIPA established a procedural framework for
ruling on questions of admissibility involving classified information before
introduction of the evidence in open court." 1
44
Mechanisms in the CIPA are implicated in at least two different
situations. A criminal defendant may already know particular classified
information needed to execute a defense. In this case a defendant seeks
permission to disclose the classified information at trial and must notify the
court and the government of the intention to do SO. 1 4 5  Conversely, the
government may wish to use classified information as evidence in the
prosecution, but it must abide by the CIPA's protective mechanisms.146 In
such circumstances the government may choose to disclose the classified
information at trial pursuant to the regulations in the CIPA and present the
information to the defense in discovery. The specific procedures in the
CIPA are somewhat complex, and necessitate a section-by-section
breakdown.
because the government information classification level was something he could not know (because
of its classified nature), any case subject to the CIPA would leave a defendant with an "impossible
burden" to fulfill. Id. There existed no way to ascertain the burden of notifying the government of
the intent to use "classified information" because a defendant would not know whether the
information was classified or not. Id. The judge ruled against the argument, stating that "[t]he terms
so defined in the Act convey a reasonable degree of certainty to a defendant of what is required." Id.
at 1427.
Even the newly created International Criminal Court incorporates procedures for protection of
national security information, allowing substitutes, summaries, redactions, limitations, and in camera
or ex parte proceedings in order to protect national security information. See Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court art. 72, July 1, 2002, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
141. See generally Tamanaha, supra note 37, at 277. The Sixth Amendment reads, in pertinent
part, that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
142. See 18 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 1-16 (1980).
143. Pappas, 94 F.3d at 799.
144. United States v. Anderson, 872 F.2d 1508, 1514 (11 th Cir. 1989).
145. Unauthorized disclosure of classified information is a serious federal offense, so a defendant
must get permission to use such information in his defense and follow the proper CIPA procedures
for use at trial.
146. Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 1-16 (1980).
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1. Pretrial Conferences and Protective Orders
At the initiation of a national security action, a party may move the
court for a pretrial conference to discuss the proposed use of classified
information at trial. 147  However, the pretrial conference will not result in
any court decision as to the proper use or admissibility of evidence. 48  A
pretrial conference will be granted at either the parties' or the court's request
because it encourages parties to resolve questions about the handling of
classified information without the court's involvement and before the trial
begins. 49  Furthermore, the pretrial conference allows the court to
familiarize itself with the CIPA and its requirements for control of evidence
at trial. 150
If the United States moves, the court will issue a protective order
prohibiting the disclosure of classified information outside of trial.' 5' This
147. Id. § 2. Section 2 reads as follows:
At any time after the filing of the indictment or information, any party may move for a
pretrial conference to consider matters relating to classified information that may arise in
connection with the prosecution. Following such motion, or on its own motion, the court
shall promptly hold a pretrial conference to establish the timing of requests for discovery,
the provision of notice required by section 5 of this Act, and the initiation of the
procedure established by section 6 of this Act. In addition, at the pretrial conference the
court may consider any matters which relate to classified information or which may
promote a fair and expeditious trial. No admission made by the defendant or by any
attorney for the defendant at such a conference may be used against the defendant unless
the admission is in writing and is signed by the defendant and by the attorney for the
defendant.
Id. § 2.
148. See Tamanaha, supra note 37, at 286 n.47. "The legislative history to this section
emphasizes that 'no substantive issues concerning the use of classified information are to be decided
in a "pre-trial conference" under this section; instead, the bill requires such issues to be decided at
the hearing under section 6."' Id. (quoting S. REP No. 96-823, at 5 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4294, 4299).
149. See id. at 285-86. "Nevertheless, inclusion of this section in CIPA is useful insofar as it
encourages participants to utilize pretrial conferences to resolve questions on how and when to
proceed . I..." Id. at 286.
150. See id. Also, Tamanaha notes that many judges are not familiar with the workings or
procedures of the CIPA, and thus, need time to familiarize themselves with the processes. Id. If
questions regarding the CIPA can be resolved in pretrial conferences, then the court's burden is
reduced. Id.
151. Classified Information Procedures Act § 3. Section 3 reads as follows: "Upon motion of the
United States, the court shall issue an order to protect against the disclosure of any classified
information disclosed by the United States to any defendant in any criminal case in a district court of
the United States." Id. In United States v. Ressam, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (W.D. Wash. 2002), the
constitutional validity of CIPA protective orders came into question. The court held that the
"public's qualified right of free access under the First Amendment" does not apply to government
documents submitted to the court in CIPA related criminal proceedings. Id. at 1265.
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order is used to ensure that any classified information provided by the
government to the defense will not be disclosed to the public. 152 Even when
providing classified information to the trial participants, the CIPA also
prescribes specific methods by which the government may further control
the disclosure.
2. Alternatives to Disclosure During Discovery: Substitution,
Redaction, or Admission
When a defendant requests classified information during discovery, the
CIPA affords the government several alternatives to production pursuant to
CIPA section 4.153 The government may move the court for permission to
redact or delete portions of the requested document, submit substitutes for
any classified information requested by the opposing party, or admit the
specific facts the requested document would tend to prove. 154 However, the
court will only allow such alternatives upon a "sufficient showing" of
necessity. 155  The substitution or admission alternatives are ostensibly better
152. Tamanaha, supra note 37, at 286. Tamanaha also notes that the protective order might not
always protect the information from disclosure if the defendant was already in possession of the
material before trial. Id. at 286-87. However, courts have extended the protective order to
encompass any classified information in the possession of the defense, whether the government
provided it or not. Id. at 287.
153. Classified Information Procedures Act § 4. Any information, classified or not, is requested
during discovery under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16. See Tamanaha, supra note 37, at
291. Rule 16 grants the court the authority to limit or modify disclosure if necessary to protect
national security. Id. However, Congress included the same protection under CIPA because judges
had previously been reluctant to exert their authority under Rule 16 to limit such access. Id.
154. Classified Information Procedures Act § 4. Section 4 reads as follows:
The court, upon a sufficient showing, may authorize the United States to delete specified
items of classified information from documents to be made available to the defendant
through discovery under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, to substitute a
summary of the information for such classified documents, or to substitute a statement
admitting relevant facts that the classified information would tend to prove. The court
may permit the United States to make a request for such authorization in the form of a
written statement to be inspected by the court alone. If the court enters an order granting
relief following such an ex parte showing, the entire text of the statement of the United
States shall be sealed and preserved in the records of the court to be made available to the
appellate court in the event of an appeal.
Id. The government must file an affidavit, stating that revelation of the true document or
information would damage national security if disclosed, before the court will allow submission of
substitutions, admissions, or redactions. See Tamanaha, supra note 37, at 291-92. It is possible that
a court will not find the affidavit compelling, and instead, will order the production of the true
document or information. Id. at 292.
155. Tamanaha, supra note 37, at 290. Discovery proceeds under the Federal Rule of Evidence,
so the burden of production falls on the government when a defendant requests classified
information. To protect against unnecessary disclosure, CIPA allows the government to aver "that
the information at issue may damage national security if disclosed." Id. at 291. The court will
consider the government guarantee to be a "sufficient showing" that the government must delete,
modify, redact, or substitute information in lieu of producing the true document. Id. at 290-91.
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for the defendant because the other options might involve heavy redaction,
limited access, or denial of access to the documents. The court might not
authorize the government to proceed with any of the alternatives and will
instead authorize the production of the true document. 156 On the other hand,
the defendant might already have the classified information in possession.
3. The Notice Requirement
There are times when the defendant will already be in possession of
classified information and will wish to disclose it at trial to provide a
defense.' 5 7  As a protective mechanism, the CIPA provides that the
defendant must give the government notice of his intention to disclose
classified information.' 5 The government will then have a "reasonable
"Redaction" allows the government to conceal the sensitive information from a document or
otherwise obscure its view. Id. at 291 n.73. "Substitution" allows the government to offer a
summary of the pertinent information contained in a document or present other less sensitive
documents that tend show the same information. Id. at 290. "Admission" allows the government to
confess whatever fact the classified information would tend to prove, in lieu of disclosing the
classified document. Id.
156. See id. at 291-92. "Once classified information is deemed discoverable the burden falls on
the government to show why it must delete information from, or otherwise modify or substitute, the
documents to be released." Id. at 291. "If the government's proposed substitution is found by the
court to be inadequate, the prosecution must release the information in its original form or face
sanctions." Id. at 291-92 (internal footnotes omitted). A "true document" refers to an unmodified
document presented without summaries, redactions, or any other changes.
157. See S. REP. No. 96-823, at 6-7 (1980) ("[W]hen a defendant expects to disclose or cause the
disclosure of classified information in a trial, he must notify the Government and the court before
trial or during trial as soon as he discovers the possibility."), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4294,
4300.
158. See Classified Information Procedures Act § 5. Section 5 reads as follows:
If a defendant reasonably expects to disclose or to cause the disclosure of classified
information in any manner in connection with any trial or pretrial proceeding involving
the criminal prosecution of such defendant, the defendant shall, within the time specified
by the court or, where no time is specified, within thirty days prior to trial, notify the
attorney for the United States and the court in writing. Such notice shall include a brief
description of the classified information. Whenever a defendant learns of additional
classified information he reasonably expects to disclose at any such proceeding, he shall
notify the attorney for the United States and the court in writing as soon as possible
thereafter and shall include a brief description of the classified information. No
defendant shall disclose any information known or believed to be classified in connection
with a trial or pretrial proceeding until notice has been given under this subsection and
until the United States has been afforded a reasonable opportunity to seek a determination
pursuant to the procedure set forth in section 6 of this Act, and until the time for the
United States to appeal such determination under section 7 has expired or any appeal
under section 7 by the United States is decided.
Id. § 5(a). In 2000, the notice and hearing requirements of the CIPA came under constitutional
opportunity" to pursue other avenues besides disclosure of information
through the procedures outlined below in CIPA section 6.159
4. The Heart of the Act: CIPA Section 6
CIPA section 6 is the center of the Act and outlines specific procedures
to follow when a defendant seeks to use classified information at trial. 160
The section "sets forth the procedures to be followed whenever decisions
regarding the form and use of classified information are made."1 6, Section 6
is especially important to this Comment because it outlines procedures that
protect classified information from public disclosure through the use of
alternatives; this same technique enables the silent witness rule to function
within the bounds of CIPA. 
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At the request of the government, the court will conduct a section 6
"relevance hearing" to "make all determinations concerning the use,
relevance, or admissibility of classified information."1 63 At this hearing, the
court determines whether proffered evidence is relevant for admission at
trial.' 64 Yet if the Attorney General certifies to the court that the hearing
itself might result in the disclosure of classified information, then the
hearing will be held in camera to prevent public disclosure. 165
attack based on the theory that they restricted a defendant's right to confront government witnesses
or remain silent during trial pursuant to the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. See United States v. Lee,
90 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1326 (D.N.M. 2000). The district court found that the requirements did not
violate the defendant's due process rights. Id. at 1329.
159. Classified Information Procedures Act § 5(a). The purpose of the notice requirement is to
forbid disclosure of classified information, not as a restraint on free speech, but to allow the
government to pursue other avenues that might not require disclosure. S. REP. No. 96-823, at 7
(1980).
160. Classified Information Procedures Act § 6. The United States Senate Report, accompanying
CIPA, clearly states that section 6 is meant to be the central aspect of the Act.
This section is the heart of the bill. It establishes a procedure for a hearing often in
camera, with both the prosecution and the defense present. The purpose of the hearing is
to determine before trial whether the classified information at issue is admissible and in
what form it may be introduced.
S. REP. No. 96-823, at 7.
161. Tamanaha, supra note 37, at 294.
162. See infra Part IV.B-C.
163. Classified Information Procedures Act § 6(a).
164. See id. However, the court may not consider that the information is classified when
determining relevance or admissibility, and the relevance inquiry will be governed solely by the
Federal Rules of Evidence. See United States v. Baptista-Rodriguez, 17 F.3d 1354, 1364 (11 th Cir.
1994) (citing United States v. Juan, 776 F.2d 256, 258 (11 th Cir. 1985); United States v. Anderson,
872 F.2d 1508, 1514 (11 th Cir. 1989)).
165. Classified Information Procedures Act § 6(a). Section 6(a) reads, in pertinent part: "Any
hearing held pursuant to this subsection (or any portion of such hearing specified in the request of
the Attorney General) shall be held in camera if the Attorney General certifies to the court in such
petition that a public proceeding may result in the disclosure of classified information." Id. § 6(a).
Furthermore, "[t]he court shall hold a hearing on any motion under this section. Any such hearing
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If the court authorizes the disclosure of classified information at the
relevance hearing, CIPA section 6 gives the government a second
opportunity to move the court for permission to submit substitutions. In
light of court authorized disclosure, the government may again seek
permission to submit a summary of the information or a statement admitting
relevant facts in lieu of disclosure.166 These alternatives are evaluated at a
section 6(c) "substitution hearing" where the court determines whether to
grant the government motion and allow substitutions.' 67  Here, the court has
an important role in determining fairness to the defendant because the CIPA
requires that a court only grant such a motion if the substituted or admitted
information would provide "substantially the same ability" to present a case
as would disclosure of the classified information. 168 Yet even if the court
denies a motion to submit a substitution or admission, the Attorney General
may file an affidavit objecting to disclosure and the court must order that the
party not disclose the information. 169  In the end the government has the
option of whether to disclose the classified information, although non-
compliance with the court order may have consequences. 70  When a
defendant is precluded from disclosing classified information necessary for a
defense due to government refusal to produce such information, the court
may elect to dismiss specific counts of the indictment against the defendant,
find against the United States on any or all counts, or eliminate testimony of
a government witness.' 7' However, the government may file an
shall be held in camera at the request of the Attorney General." Id. § 6(c)(1).
166. See id. § 6(c)(1); see infra text accompanying note 183 for language set forth in CIPA section
6(c)(1).
167. Id. § 6(c).
168. Id. § 6(c)(1). "The court shall grant such a motion of the United States if it finds that the
statement or summary will provide the defendant with substantially the same ability to make his
defense as would disclosure of the specific classified information." Id. The district court affirmed
this established principle in United States v. Libby, 467 F. Supp. 2d 20, 24-25 (D.D.C. 2006), stating
that "the Court is not limited in the manner in which it permits substitutions, so long as the approved
substitutions 'provide the defendant with substantially the same ability to make his defense."' Id.
(citation omitted).
169. Classified Information Procedures Act § 6(e)(1).
170. Id. § 6(e)(2). If the government refuses to disclose classified information pursuant to a court
order, the court may dismiss the charges against a defendant. Tamanaha, supra note 37, at 298.
171. Classified Information Procedures Act § 6(e)(2). The Senate Report illustrates both
situations where classified information should be disclosed and where disclosure will be impossible,
resulting in the necessary dismissal of a case. The report uses a sliding scale to evaluate the trade-
offs regarding disclosure of classified information.
In cases where the information is so sensitive that this alternative is unacceptable to the
Government on the grounds of national security, a high official of the Department of
Justice can object to the disclosure of the information. The court then must issue an order
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interlocutory appeal to a court of appeals to contest a district court order that
authorized disclosure of classified information, imposed judicial sanctions
against the government, or refused to issue a protective order. 
7 2
All this, of course, provides a remarkable parallel to the recent
controversy surrounding the state secrets doctrine. In a state secrets case, a
civil action (and possibly a criminal action) brought against the United
States may be subject to outright dismissal, depriving the litigant of a chance
to prove the merits of the action.173  Conversely, in criminal actions
involving the CIPA, the government may be subject to a court order
compelling production of a classified document.174  The government may
not be willing or able to provide such a sensitive document, ostensibly in the
name of national security, and the American people are deprived of the
ability to prosecute and convict a criminal defendant-possibly a defendant
involved in terrorism or espionage against the United States. 75  In neither
that is designed to ensure that the defendant's ability to prepare for his defense is not
impaired due to the Government's decision not to disclose the information. In testimony
before the Senate Intelligence Committee, Phillip Lacovara, former Deputy Solicitor
General, explained that a sliding scale of sanctions can be taken against the Government
when the Government has a legitimate claim that national security information cannot be
disclosed.
"At one end of the scale, for example, if the defendant's possible use for the
information is totally speculative, the case simply could be continued without disclosure.
At the other end of the scale, where the information is central to the question of guilt or
innocence and where no alternative to public disclosure is possible, dismissal may be
necessary. In between, procedures such as instructing the jury to assume that the missing
information would have proved a given proposition may be possible. Certainly the
Department of Justice should press for some intermediate treatment like that before
deciding that the case must be abandoned."
It should be emphasized, however, that the court should not balance the national
security interests of the Government against the rights of the defendant to obtain the
information. The sanctions against the Government are designed to make the defendant
whole again. After the Judge has issued this order, the Government may exercise its right
to take an interlocutory appeal.
S. REP. No. 96-823, at 9 (1980) (quoting former Deputy Solicitor General Phillip Lacovara),
reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4294, 4302-03. But the courts are authorized to use discretion
regarding the proper sanctions in a particular case. It appears that in at least one case, the United
States refused to adhere to a court ordered disclosure of information and the non-disclosure resulted
in dismissal. See United States v. Fernandez, 913 F.2d 148, 153-54 (4th Cir. 1990). The United
States appealed an order from the district court's evidentiary rulings under the CIPA as well as a
sanction dismissing the action. Id. at 154. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgments of the district
court and it appears that the action against Fernandez was dismissed under the authority of CIPA
section 6(e)(2). Id. at 163. But cf United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 476 (4th Cir. 2004)
(asserting that dismissal would be appropriate under the CIPA for government refusal to produce
relevant enemy combatant witnesses, but that "a more measured approach is required" because the
government correctly exercised its prerogative in protecting classified information from disclosure).
172. Classified Information Procedures Act § 7.
173. See supra Part I.A.
174. Classified Information Procedures Act § 6(a).
175. In the event that the head of an executive agency files an affidavit refusing to produce
discoverable documents, the prosecution in a criminal case has little choice in whether to continue
244
[Vol. 36: 213, 2008] The Muted Rise of the Silent Witness Rule
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
situation does dismissal seem to be the best choice for either the government
or the opposing party-a new twist on CIPA might provide the answer.
IV. THE SILENT WITNESS RULE: A STATE SECRETS SOLUTION
A. Conceived from the Language of the CIPA
From the language of the CIPA, the government crafted the silent
witness rule, in which trial participants refer to classified information
through the use of a document or "key card" designating code names for
classified places, names, or documents. 17 6 Instead of disclosing a piece of
classified information, trial participants use the corresponding code word to
indicate a particular reference.' 77 Thus, the silent witness rule protects
against public disclosure of classified information used as evidence. 1'7 8 Such
a proposal might indeed eliminate the need for state secrets dismissals in
cases such as El-Masri7 9 and Reynolds,10  because state secrets are
protected while litigation continues.
The evidentiary theory behind the silent witness rule emanates from the
substitution mechanisms of CIPA section 6.'81 The section allows the
government to offer substitutes for classified documents instead of the actual
documents or information. 82  The pertinent language from CIPA section
6(c) states:
Upon any determination by the court authorizing the disclosure of
specific classified information under the procedures established by
the prosecution if the evidence is necessary to either party. The court will dismiss the case, sanction
the government, or find against the United States. Id. § 6(e)(2).
176. See United States v. Rosen, 520 F. Supp. 2d 786, 793-94 (E.D. Va. 2007). "Trial
participants" include the judge, jury, witnesses, defendant, defense counsel, and government
counsel. Id. Although the public could still observe the trial, the key card prohibits disclosure of the
classified information. Id.
177. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
178. See id. at 794. Public observers in the court gallery would not, ostensibly, be able to discover
the classified information due to use of the code words. The record would reflect the use of the code
words as well, and so a reading of the record would not reveal the classified information.
179. El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 373 (2007); see
also supra Part I.
180. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1,2 (1953) (Vinson, C.J.); see also supra Part I.
181. See infra note 274 and accompanying text (describing the government's introduction of the
silent witness rule under CIPA section 6).
182. In some cases, the requested information is audio recording or testimony from a particular
witness rather than printed document. See United States v. Rosen, 520 F. Supp. 2d 786, 797 n.20
(E.D. Va. 2007); United States v. Marzook, 435 F. Supp. 2d 708, 714 (N.D. Ill. 2006).
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this section, the United States may move that, in lieu of the
disclosure of such specific classified information, the court order-
(A) the substitution for such classified information of a statement
admitting relevant facts that the specific classified information
would tend to prove; or (B) the substitution for such classified
information of a summary of the specific classified information. 183
This language is the backbone of the silent witness rule and allows
substitutions to be admitted as evidence so long as the trial remains fair to
both parties. 184 As stated in United States v. Zettl:. 5
Under such a rule, the witness would not disclose the information
from the classified document in open court. Instead, the witness
would have a copy of the classified document before him. The
court, counsel and the jury would also have copies of the classified
document. The witness would refer to specific places in the
document in response to questioning. The jury would then refer to
the particular part of the document as the witness answered. By this
method, the classified information would not be made public at trial
but the defense would be able to present that classified information
to the jury. 186
183. Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 6(c) (1980).
184. The CIPA grants wide latitude for the government to propose substitutions for classified
evidence. Courts should be careful to remember that a particular case may deal with evidence of a
highly sensitive nature that could significantly damage national security if revealed. "However, in
passing upon a motion under Section 6(c) the trial judge should bear in mind that the proffered
defense evidence does involve national security. Such a motion should be granted if the alternative
'will provide the defendant with substantially the same ability to make his defense."' United States
v. Juan, 776 F.2d 256, 258 (1 1th Cir. 1985) (internal citation omitted). It is not for the court to
determine whether or not disclosure of the information would harm national security; thus, the court
should not attempt to balance the government's national security concerns against the rights of the
defendant to have access to the information. See Tamanaha, supra note 37, at 298-99. The
government proposes alternatives to disclosure, which the court will evaluate and determine whether
the defendant will be afforded substantially the same ability to make a defense, using the substitution
rather than the true document.
Whether or not an alternative would be sufficient for the protection of the national
interest in the security of classified information is not to be determined by the court.
What may appear to the court to be innocuous may be dangerously revealing to those
more informed. The government is the party to propose Section 6(c) alternatives. The
court may find that a 6(c) alternative proposed by the government will provide the
defendant with his defense, even though the defendant might rather threaten his
prosecutor with the disclosure of more detail.
Juan, 776 F.2d at 258-59.
185. United States v. Zettl, 835 F.2d 1059 (4th Cir. 1987).
186. Id. at 1063. "Trial participants" include the judge, prosecution, defendant, and defendant's
counsel. Rosen, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 793-94. Although the public could still observe the trial, the use
of the key cards prohibits disclosure of the classified information. Id. at 794.
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Per the silent witness rule, the trial participants would refer to classified
places, names, or documents through the use of code words printed on a
"key card" in lieu of the actual information. 187  Therefore, each trial
participant could know the classified information of reference by looking at
the corresponding information on the key card.'88 The doctrine allows use
of the information to the extent necessary for a fair trial while protecting the
information from public disclosure because neither the record nor the
audience would know the pertinent information. '8 9
187. Rosen, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 793.
188. Id.
189. See id. at 794.
B. Development. Implicit Approvals of the Silent Witness Rule
A few cases illustrate approvals of similar presentations of evidence,' 90
but only three published cases verify the government's attempts to introduce
the silent witness rule to the judiciary.' 9' In two of the three attempts, the
190. "Other courts, without using the '[silent witness rule]' term, have approved the presentation
of evidence in one form to the jury and in another form to the public. In doing so, these courts have
given effect to Congress'[s] express intent in enacting CIPA that federal district judges" should
fashion creative solutions to the problems arising through the use of classified information at trial.
Id. at 796. The approvals included the use of classified documents at trial while redacted versions
were made available to the public, the use of "key cards" to hide the identities of witnesses from the
public but not from the trial participants, and the use of alternate names, locations, and pseudonyms
to protect classified information from public disclosure. Id. Such implicit approvals demonstrate
that the judiciary is willing to entertain the silent witness rule-or at least similar evidentiary
mechanisms.
In United States v. Pelton, 696 F. Supp. 156, 156 (D. Md. 1986), the United States charged
Ronald William Pelton with six counts of delivery of national defense information to a foreign
government, as well as several lesser offenses. Id. The government intended to offer several pieces
of classified evidence, including two recordings of telephone calls that Pelton allegedly made, and
proposed to offer a redacted version of the recordings to the public and the press while playing the
unredacted version to the court and trial participants through headphones. Id. at 156-57. The court
agreed with the defendant and intervenors that such a proposal would amount to court closure
appropriate only in limited circumstances and further agreed that a presumption against closure
existed. Id. at 157-58. However, upon weighing the interest of the public in maintaining open and
public trial and the interest of the government in protecting national security, the court held that
"both interests can be reasonably well-accommodated by making public a redacted version of the
transcripts." Id. at 159. In this way, the court paralleled the silent witness rule's proposition that
trial participants can access information during trial that will not be made public.
In United States v. George, Nos. 91-0521(RCL) and 92-0215(RCL), 1992 WL 200027, at *1
(D.D.C. July 29, 1992), the court ruled on a government motion to protect the identities of
undercover CIA officers called to testify at trial. See id. at * 1-3. An affidavit by the Deputy
Director of the CIA requested that: (1) the court authorize the officers to testify in light disguise; (2)
no courtroom artist be allowed to sketch the officers; and (3) the names not be publicly disclosed.
Id. at * 1-2. To effect these requests, the government proposed to disclose the witnesses' identities
to the trial participants in the form of a "key card" which revealed their true names and that the court
permit the witnesses to enter and exit the courthouse without using public entrances. Id. The
defendant opposed the motion only to the extent that he preferred the officers shield their identities
from public view by testifying behind a screen instead of in light disguise. Id. at *2. The court
approved all the Deputy Director's requests except the witnesses were ordered to testify behind a
screen rather than in light disguise. Id. Importantly, the court approved a presentation of evidence
similar to the silent witness rule through the use of a "key card" to relate the true identities of the
witnesses to the trial participants. See id. at *3.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit confirmed that the district court could
decide, in its discretion, whether "non-substantive changes" such as alternate names and locations
would be appropriate substitutions under the CIPA. United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 457,
480 (4th Cir. 2004) (allowing the use of substitutions in lieu of classified evidence in a case of
conspiracy regarding the September 1 Ith attacks). Likewise, the district court in United States v.
Marzook, 435 F. Supp. 2d 708 (N.D. Ill. 2006) allowed Israeli agents to testify using pseudonyms in
a RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations) action against defendants who allegedly
conspired to support the Hamas terrorist organization.
191. See Rosen, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 794. According to Judge Ellis, the only three cases with
published dispositions include United States v. Fernandez, 913 F.2d 148 (4th Cir. 1990), United
States v. North, No. 88-0080-02, 1988 WL 148481 (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 1988), and United States v.
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district court denied the proposal due to specific circumstances in the
cases. 192 In the third case, the court tacitly approved the proposal, but never
had the opportunity to implement it because of interlocutory appeal by the
government. 93  Yet each of these cases demonstrates implicit judicial
approval of the concept. 1
94
1. United States v. Zettl
United States v. Zettl, in 1987, was the first case to allude to the silent
witness rule.'9 The case consisted of a government interlocutory appeal
from a pre-trial evidentiary ruling in a trial for conspiracy, conversion, and
espionage. 196 Defendants allegedly passed classified information to
unauthorized persons who used it to obtain a competitive advantage in the
Zettl, 835 F.2d 1059 (4th Cir. 1987). Rosen, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 794 n.1 1.
192. See Fernandez, 913 F.2d at 161-62; see also North, 1988 WL 148481, at *3.
193. See Zettl, 835 F.2d at 1063-64.
194. Rosen, 520 F. Supp. 2d at i96. "The [silent witness rule] is a novel evidence presentation
technique that has received little judicial attention in the context of the use of classified information
in trials. No published decision has explicitly approved or endorsed use of the rule in this context.
Indeed, the government has only proposed the [silent witness rule] in three reported cases." Id. at
794. "And, indeed, while no court has squarely addressed this precise question, a few courts have
implicitly approved the use of the [silent witness rule] at trial." Id. at 796. Though not referred to as
"the silent witness rule," other courts have approved presentations of evidence in similar form. See
supra note 190 and accompanying text.
195. Zettl, 835 F.2d at 1059 (argued November It, 1986 and decided December 17, 1987).
196. Id. at 1060. Bernie E. Zettl, defendant and paid contractor for GTE, worked with co-
defendants Robert R. Carter and Walter R. Edgington. Id. At the time, Carter and Edgington
possessed Top Secret security clearances, and Zettl possessed a Secret clearance. Id. at 1061 n.8.
Each of the three defendants was charged with conspiracy to convert classified documents to their
own use, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Id. at 1060. Specifically, Zettl was charged with
conversion and use of the 1984 Navy Program Element Descriptions (PEDs) without authority to do
so, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641. Id. Edgington was charged with receiving, retaining, and
concealing the 1984 PEDs with the intent to convert them to his own use, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 641-642. Id. Zettl was charged with delivering the 1984 PEDs to Edgington, a person not
authorized to receive them, in violation of the Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. § 793(e). Id. Edgington
was also charged, under the Espionage Act, for receiving the 1984 PEDs while not authorized to
receive the documents. Id. Specifically, the indictments alleged that the three conspired to convert
classified United States Navy documents to their own use. Id.
The documents were primarily budgetary information that would then be disseminated to
some employees within GTE to be used in preparing bids and contracts to be submitted to
the government. Through possession of these documents, GTE had access to
[Department of Defense (DoD)] information about the kinds of electronic technology the
government would be seeking through government contracts and the amount of money
DoD would seek from Congress to carry on these various projects.
Id.
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bidding for government contracts. 197  The defendants used classified
documents accessed through their place of work, the most sensitive of which
were Navy Program Element Descriptions (PEDs) for 1984 that included
internal government budgetary numbers classified as Secret. 198
At trial, pursuant to CIPA section 5, the defendants notified the
government of their intention to use classified documents for their
defense.' 99 At a closed section 6(a) relevancy hearing, the government
objected to the defendant's use of any classified documents other than the
1984 PEDs (which the government "planned to introduce in their
entirety").2 00  Throughout this process, the government steadfastly took the
position that the district court's only role during the hearing was to evaluate
the relevance of the classified documents. 201 The court found, after lengthy
197. Zettl, 835 F.2d at 1060-61. Usually, access to classified information is controlled with dual
protections from the classifying government agency. See Exec. Order No. 13,292, 68 Fed. Reg.
15315 (Mar. 25, 2003). First, the person accessing the information must have a security clearance
equal to, or higher than the classification level of the information or document. Id. The highest
clearance is "Top Secret," followed by "Secret," and then "Confidential." Id. Second, the person
must have the requisite "need to know" the information. Id. According to Zettl, "need to know" is
a determination made by the possessor of classified information that a prospective
recipient, in the interest of national security, has a requirement for access to . . .
knowledge of, or possession of the classified information in order to perform tasks or
services essential to the fulfillment of a classified contract or program.
Zettl, 835 F.2d at 1061 n.9 (citing DoD 5220.22-R, Industrial Security Manual for Safe-Guarding
Classified Information (Dec. 4 1985)). The access to internal government budgetary numbers
explained the technology the government would seek to acquire, and the amount of money the DoD
would seek from Congress in order to contract for these technologies. Id. at 1060. Therefore, GTE
would know how much money the government would be willing to spend.
198. See Zettl, 835 F.2d at 1060-61. The government alleged that only portions of the classified
PEDs were available to properly cleared individuals who had the need to know the information. Id.
at 1061. According to the government, defendant Edgington received the complete PEDs (not just
the portions available) from Zettl. Id. Although each of the defendants held proper security
clearances, none had a "need to know." Id. Thus, under the government's theory, the mere
possession of the complete PEDs without the "need to know" was a violation of the law. Id. The
defense argued that the defendants were authorized to receive the information through the proper
channels, so receiving the same information from a different source cannot be illegal. Id.
199. Id. at 1061; Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 5(a) (1980). "Section
5(a) requires a criminal defendant who expects to disclose or cause the disclosure of classified
information in connection with the trial or pretrial proceedings to provide, to the court and
prosecution, written notice and a brief description of the classified information." Tamanaha, supra
note 37, at 292.
200. Zettl, 835 F.2d at 1061-62. The government requested the closed "relevancy" hearing
pursuant to CIPA section 6(a). At the hearing, the district court had to determine the relevance of
the 1984 PEDs, consisting of 920 un-classified pages and 300 classified pages. Id. at 1062. The
court reviewed all the PEDs documents under the assumption that the government would be using a
large amount of classified information in the prosecution. Id.
201. Zettl, 835 F.2d at 1062. The government believed it inappropriate that the court rule, during
the CIPA section 6(a) relevance hearing, on any application of common law privileges the United
States might want to assert. Id. Therefore, the government did not assert any privileges related to
the evidence under review at the relevance hearing. Id. However, the failure to assert any privilege
resulted from an apparent misunderstanding of the Fourth Circuit's holding in United States v. Smith,
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examination, that nearly 192 documents were relevant to the defense and
tentatively admitted them for use at trial.20 2 The government then moved to
submit substitutions for the tentatively admitted classified documents under
CIPA section 6(c) in order to prevent unnecessary disclosure of the
classified information. 0 3 After hearing four proposed substitutions at the
section 6(c) substitution hearing, the district court rejected the proposals and
found that none of the recommendations were adequate.20 4
At the aforementioned section 6(c) substitution hearing, the government
suggested the district court adopt the "silent witness rule" as to most of the
classified documents.0 5 Under the proposal in Zettl, a witness would not
disclose any of the classified information in open court.20 6 Instead the judge,
jury, defense counsel, and prosecution would have copies of the classified
document under examination. 2°' The witness would refer to specific
portions of the document throughout the testimony without revealing the
actual information. 2 ' The judge, jury, and counsel would be able to look at
780 F.2d 1102 (4th Cir. 1985). In Smith, the court stated that "[t]he district court correctly
concluded that CIPA was merely a procedural tool requiring a pretrial court ruling on the
admissibility of classified information." Smith, 780 F.2d at 1106. Likely, the government construed
Smith to mean that no rulings could take place at the section 6(a) relevance hearing other than
decisions on relevance.
202. Zettl, 835 F.2d at 1062. The court acted upon the assumption that the United States would
introduce all the PEDs documents at trial, and proceeded to consider "hundreds of classified
documents identified by the defense." Id. The process of review took the court several days. Id.
The court tentatively admitted the documents, presumably because the court expected the United
States to raise privilege issues. Id.
203. Id. at 1063. Rather than disclose the actual classified document, the government proposed
the court accept a statement admitting the facts that the PEDs would tend to prove. Id. As long as
the statement placed the defendant in the same evidentiary position as the actual documents would
have, the court would likely grant the motion. Id. at 1062 n. 13. Under the scheme, the government
would keep the classified documents safe from public disclosure while the defense would have
admissions of pertinent fact by the United States. Id. at 1062-63.
204. Id. at 1063. The district court found the substitutions inadequate because the proposals did
not meet the section 6(c)(1) requirement that the court grant such motion only if the defendant would
have "substantially the same ability" to make its defense as it would have with full use of the
classified documents. Id. at 1062 & n.13, 1063. The government offered three proposed
substitutions, while the defense offered their own proposed substitutions. Id. at 1063.
205. Id. The Fourth Circuit related what happened at the district court level: "At the 6(c)
substitution hearing, the district court also ruled upon the government's request for what the court
called the silent witness rule to be used at trial for the handling of classified documents." Id.
206. Id. "By this method, the classified information would not be made public at trial but the
defense would be able to present that classified information to the jury." Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. Upon hearing a witness's testimony, the jury would look at the part of the document
referenced in the testimony. Id. The jury would understand what the witness referred to, without
any party revealing the actual information to the public or on the record. Id.
the sections of the classified document referred to during questioning and
would understand the witness's responses. 20 9 The district court approved the
use of this scheme during the trial as to most of the classified documents,
reiterating that the 1984 PEDs would be admitted for use in open court.21 °
From the outset of trial the government was "ambivalent as to whether
or not it would introduce the 1984 Navy PEDs into evidence. 211  The
government assured the court that the PEDs would be introduced.212 Upon
such introduction, the court intended to allow the government to offer
evidence of whether disclosure "would create an identifiable danger to...
national security. ' ' 2 13 If such evidence were presented, then the court would
take the proper precautions to assure the protection of classified
209. Id.
210. Id. The defense indicated that it would not object to the silent witness rule as to the majority
of the classified documents, but that they would likely object to the use of the silent witness rule
with regard to the 1984 PEDs. Id. The trial court's admission of the 1984 PEDs for use at trial
created confusion for the United States. Id. "The government construes the district court's direction
to mean that it was ordering the United States to offer the document into evidence without
qualification and in all events .... " Id. at 1063 n. 14. The United States believed that this tentative
admission was the final decision of the trial court, while the trial court expected the government to
assert a privilege upon the tentative admission. Id. at 1064. Instead, the district court was
attempting to give "a thinly veiled warning that the government might suffer adverse consequences
if the document were not offered into evidence." Id. at 1063 n.14.
211. Id. at 1063. There remained questions regarding what the government "intended to prove
from [the PEDs], how much thereof it intended to introduce into evidence, and its refusal to be
pinned down as to a theory of the case with respect to the classified documents and testimony." Id.
at 1064. Once introduced by the government, the court intended to allow defendants the opportunity
to explain whether they legitimately came into possession of the classified documents and whether
they had the requisite "need to know." Id.; see also supra note 197 and accompanying text (defining
"need to know").
212. Zettl, 835 F.2d at 1063 & n.14. Even upon assurances by the United States Attorney that the
government intended to introduce the PEDs as evidence at trial, there remained legitimate concern as
to what the government intended to prove. Id. at 1064. Due to these assurances, the district court
assumed that all of the 1984 PEDs documents would be offered as evidence of the defendant's guilt.
Id. The government, however, asserted that it should have the discretion to introduce the whole
document, only the portions related to the programs at issue, or attempt to prove its case without the
PEDs, and that the district court's only role would be to determine relevance of the documents at
trial. Id. at 1063-64. In construing the government's arguments, and the relationship between the
government and the court, the opinion noted that:
The government construes the district court's direction to mean that it was ordering the
United States to offer the document into evidence without qualification and in all events;
we do not. We think that, read in context, the direction of the district court was a thinly
veiled warning that the government might suffer adverse consequences if the documents
were not offered into evidence. The government, not the court, is the final authority on
whether it will offer a classified document into evidence. The court, not the government,
then decides the consequences of any failure to offer such evidence.
Id. at 1063 n.14.
213. Id. at 1064. The district court found that the government did not present any evidence of
such an identifiable danger to national security that would require an "evaluation of its previous
rulings on relevance and admissibility." Id.
[Vol. 36: 213, 2008] The Muted Rise of the Silent Witness Rule
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
information.21 4  However, the government assumed that the tentative
admission in open court would be without any qualification or protection
and appealed the evidentiary decisions to the Fourth Circuit through
interlocutory appeal.21 5
In reviewing the rulings, the Fourth Circuit noted that the language used
by the district court regarding an "identifiable danger to ... national
security" referred to the Reynolds decision regarding the state secrets
privilege rather than protection of classified information under the CIPA.21 6
The Circuit found for the government, stating that it was entitled to assert
any privilege it might have, including state secrets, during CIPA section 6(a)
relevancy hearings and section 6(c) substitution hearings. 27  Because the
appeal itself was from a pretrial order regarding the admissibility of
classified evidence, the Fourth Circuit did not consider whether the silent
witness rule was proper. 218  The district court approved the silent witness
rule for limited use in Zettl, but never implemented the rule because of the
interlocutory appeal.219
2. United States v. North
In 1990 the United States charged Lieutenant Colonel Oliver L. North, a
former member of the National Security Council, with crimes related to the
214. Id.
The district court finally acquiesced in the government's position and explicitly stated in
its order that it had indicated that its initial rulings on relevancy and admissibility were
tentative based on its belief that the government would present or proffer evidence
showing that the public disclosure of a particular item of classified information would
create an identifiable danger to the national security ....
Id.
215. Id. The government's appeal of the evidentiary rulings also supports the notion that the
government believed the information would be disclosed without adequate protections afforded
under the CIPA. Id.
216. Id. (citing United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1953)).
While the language of the court was that of the statute, it obviously was referring to...
[Reynolds], in which the Court stated that a claim of privilege for a state secret be lodged
by the head of the department which has control of the matter after personal consideration
of that officer.
Zettl, 835 F.2d at 1064.
217. Zettl, 835 F.2d at 1065-66. The court further clarified its ruling, that by holding that "the
state secret and informer's privilege should be asserted in the [section] 6(a) hearings, we do not
mean to imply that similar considerations should not be present in the court's consideration of
substitution motions under [section] 6(c)." Id. at 1067.
218. See id. at 1064-67.
219. Id.
attempted cover-up of the "Iran-Contra Affair., 220  Congressional
investigating committees subpoenaed the testimony of North, who asserted
his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. 2 1  However, the
government compelled his testimony and North testified at investigatory
hearings.222 Subsequently, a district court convicted North of criminal
wrongdoings perpetrated while trying to cover up the Affair.223
During the prosecution in United States v. North,224 the district court
held a series of hearings under the CIPA to determine the relevancy and
permissible disclosure of documents the government proposed to offer in its
220. United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (appeal from convictions for
criminal wrongdoing related to the Iran-Contra affair). When a Lebanese newspaper reported that
the United States was selling arms to Iran in an attempt to secure the release of American hostages
while secretly diverting some of the money to aid Nicaraguan rebels, Congress launched an
investigation. Id. The Iran-Contra Affair involved the clandestine sale of arms and munitions to
Iran, the proceeds of which were diverted to assist Nicaraguan rebels known as the "Contras." Id.
According to the official investigation:
The Iran/contra affair concerned two secret Reagan Administration policies whose
operations were coordinated by National Security Council staff. The Iran operation
involved efforts in 1985 and 1986 to obtain the release of Americans held hostage in the
Middle East through the sale of U.S. weapons to Iran, despite an embargo on such sales.
The contra operations from 1984 through most of 1986 involved the secret governmental
support of contra military and paramilitary activities in Nicaragua, despite congressional
prohibition of this support.
The Iran and contra operations were merged when funds generated from the sale of
weapons to Iran were diverted to support the contra effort in Nicaragua. Although this
"diversion" may be the most dramatic aspect of Iran/contra, it is important to emphasize
that both the Iran and contra operations, separately, violated United States policy and law.
I LAWRENCE E. WALSH, FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL FOR IRAN/CONTRA
MATTERS xiii (1993), available at http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/execsum.htm (internal footnotes
omitted).
221. North, 910F.2dat 851.
222. Id. The government gave North use immunity during the testimony, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
6002, which authorizes a congressional committee or agency of the United States to order a witness
to testify even though the witness asserts the Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination. Id.
Under this statute, nothing said pursuant to compulsion may be used against the witness in a criminal
trial, with the exception of prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or refusing to testify
under the order. Id. at 853 n. I. The government may still prosecute the witness for crimes through
the "Kastigar doctrine," which allows the government to use evidence derived from a legitimate
source that is completely independent from the immunized testimony. Elizabeth Bradshaw, The
Scope of the Use Immunity Statute and Its Perjury Exception: Can Immunized Evidence be Used to
Prosecute Perjury or Crimes Committed After an Immunized Proceeding?, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV.
161, 173 & n.85 (2007) (citing Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441(1972)).
223. North, 910 F.2d at 851. The district court convicted North.
After extensive pretrial proceedings and a twelve-week trial, North was convicted in May
of 1989 on three counts: aiding and abetting an endeavor to obstruct Congress in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1505 and 2 ("Count 6"); destroying, altering, or removing
official NSC documents in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2071 ("Count 9"); and accepting an
illegal gratuity, consisting of a security system for his home, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
201(c)(l)(B) ("Count 10").
Id. at 851-52.
224. United States v. North, No. 88-0080-02, 1988 WL 148481 (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 1988).
254
[Vol. 36: 213, 2008] The Muted Rise of the Silent Witness Rule
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
prosecution.225 The in camera proceedings required the court to determine
whether the government's use of classified evidence through redaction and
substitution would be allowable at trial.226
The court was concerned both with protecting the classified information
and providing the jury with pertinent information in an understandable
form.227 After in camera proceedings, the district court decided not to allow
CIPA substitutions.228 Instead, the court decided to move forward with the
action and directed the government to disclose the pertinent classified
information, subject only to minimal protections.22 9  During the same
hearing the district court rejected the government's suggestion that "only the
Court, counsel, and jurors shall use documents.., under the so-called
'silent-witness rule.' 230 Specifically, the court found that the silent witness
225. North, 1988 WL 148481, at *1. The hearings proceeded under CIPA section 6. Id.
226. Id. North opposed any redaction or substitution under the CIPA, arguing that the statute
violated his rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Id.
North hoped that he would be allowed to inform the court "of his defense ex parte and that the Court
should release classified materials to accommodate that defense without consulting the government."
Id. at *I n. I. Yet the court found that "CIPA and criminal pretrial practice generally requires use of
the normal adversary process at this late stage of the case." Id.
227. Id. at * 1. The court considered two factors when reviewing North's opposition.
Only two factors have served as the basis for each of the Court's rulings during the
course of the in camera hearings as well as decisions recorded in this public
Memorandum. Primarily the Court has sought to identify relevant and material facts
contained in classified text which the government proposes to withhold, and to require
disclosure accordingly. Secondarily, it has been obliged to focus on the need for
disclosure to place the expected proof in a context which will enable the jury to
understand the proof as it is entered into evidence. At no time has the Court ordered
disclosure because it considered the classification of the information inappropriate under
the controlling classification procedures.
Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at *2. The court decided that the names of government officials and United States
citizens must be identified, except those names associated with intelligence agencies. Id.
References to the countries of Nicaragua, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Jamaica,
Iran, Israel, and other geographic locations within those countries were ordered to be identified. Id.
Other counties and geographic locations mentioned in the classified documents were ordered to be
referred to as "a South American country," "a European country," and so forth. Id. The location of
any CIA facility was substituted for a neutral word such as "city," "village," etcetera. Id. Foreign
officials were designated by the contra affiliation and rank. Id. For files, designations or references
to degree of classification were not allowed, but information pertaining to the distribution of such
files remained available for examination. Id. Methods of intelligence collection remained classified,
substituted for the terms "reliable intelligence" or "up-to-date intelligence." Id. Redactions in tape
recordings were approved. Id.
230. Id. at *3 (citing United States v. Zetl, 835 F.2d 1059 (4th Cir. 1987)).
rule would not serve the interests of this particular case because of the
"thousands of pages of redacted material and numerous substitutions. ' 23'
3. United States v. Fernandez
In another trial relating to the Iran-Contra Affair, two investigative
bodies began to investigate the role of Joseph Fernandez, Chief of Station
for the CIA in Costa Rica.232 Allegedly, Fernandez lied to the investigative
bodies about the purpose and ownership of an airstrip in Costa Rica, the
involvement of Lieutenant Colonel Oliver L. North, and contents of
shipments he delivered to the Nicaraguan Contras.233 As a defense,
Fernandez intended to show that his statements to the investigating bodies
were actually true.234 In order to prove the truth of his statements,
Fernandez needed to introduce classified evidence at trial that allegedly
revealed the truth about the CIA's relationship with the Costa Rican
airstrip.235 Pursuant to the CIPA, Fernandez notified the government and the
district court of his intent to introduce nearly 5000 possibly relevant
classified documents tending to prove the CIA's relationship with the
airstrip and presence in Costa Rica.236
The court conducted hearings regarding the admissibility and relevance
of the information under CIPA section 6(a) and agreed that Fernandez
needed to disclose classified information to demonstrate the CIA's role in
the Iran-Contra Affair and to prove the veracity of Fernandez's
statements.237 After the district court authorized the disclosure of the
information, the government moved to admit substitutions of the classified
231. Id. at*3.
232. United States v. Fernandez, 913 F.2d 148, 150 (4th Cir. 1990). On April 29, 1989, the
United States indicted Fernandez on two counts of making false statements to the investigative
bodies, one of which was the CIA Inspector General. Id. at 150. The CIA Office of Inspector
General started investigating the Iran-Contra Affair in November of 1986 pursuant to a disclosure by
the Attorney General that proceeds from arms sales "may have been diverted to assist the
Nicaraguan resistance forces known as the Contras." Id.
233. Id. at 150-51.
234. Id. at 151. By showing that his statements were true, Fernandez would avoid prosecution for
allegedly making false official statements to the investigating bodies.
235. Id. Counts one and two of the indictment charged specific false statements relating to the
location of an airstrip in Costa Rica. Id. at 150. Moreover, the indictment alleged that Fernandez
lied about his contact with a National Security Council staffer in Costa Rica allegedly connected to
the airstrip construction, specifying that Fernandez told the investigators that the Costa Rican
government built the airstrip for training activities pursuant to a feared invasion from Nicaragua. Id.
at 150-51. To prove his innocence, Fernandez intended to demonstrate that "the airstrip was part of
a comprehensive * * * * initiative designed to repel a potential invasion by Nicaragua." Id. at 151;
see also id. at 150 n. I (noting that omitted classified information is denoted as "* * *
236. Id. at 151.
237. Id. at 152. The court ruled that some categories of evidence were irrelevant, but it also ruled
that two categories of information were relevant to Fernandez's defense. Id.
256
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information under CIPA section 6(c). 238  The court rejected several of the
government's proposals for substitutions because they failed to adequately
describe the nature of the program and were "inadequate to 'provide the
defendant with substantially the same ability to make his defense as would
disclosure of the specific classified information' per the requirements in
section 6(c)( 1). 239
On the morning of trial, the government pursued an eleventh-hour effort
to protect the information by proposing the use of the silent witness rule.24 °
The proposal indicated that pertinent locations could be identified by a
number when referred to in open court.24' A written key provided to the
jury would identify the names of the locations referred to during
testimony.242 The district court rejected this proposal because it would not
provide Fernandez with a fair trial. 243
Before trial, the Attorney General filed an affidavit under CIPA section
6(e)(1), prohibiting the disclosure of any of the classified information at
trial. 244  The district court dismissed with prejudice the charges against
Fernandez because the inability to use the information in his defense
violated his right to a fair trial. 245 The government appealed from the district
court's evidentiary rulings, proposed substitutions, and dismissal.246
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held "the court did not abuse its discretion
either in admitting [the] evidence or in rejecting the government's proposed
substitutions for this evidence., 247 The circuit further found that the district
238. Id
239. Id. at 152-53 (quoting Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 6(c)(1)
(1980)).
240. Fernandez, 913 F.2d at 153.
241. Id. ("Finally, on July 24, the morning of trial, the government submitted revised proposals
which provided that the * * * * locations could be referred to by a number in open court that
correlated with a written key provided to the jurors identifying the actual locations."); see also id. at
150 n.1 (noting that omitted classified information is denoted as "*").
242. Id. at 153.
243. Id. ("Relying on its July 13 ruling that the actual identity of the * * * * was required to
provide Fernandez with a fair trial, the district court rejected these proposals too."); see also id. at
150 n. I (noting that omitted classified information is denoted as " * * ).
244. Id. The Attorney General's affidavit was accompanied by affidavits by the Director of the
CIA, the Deputy Director for Operations of the CIA, and an unnamed official. Id. These
accompanying affidavits corroborated the Attorney General's affidavit. Id.
245. Id. The court ruled that the "information concerning the stations and projects was 'essential
for the defendant to put forth a defense in this case and to receive a fair trial."' Id. (internal citation
omitted). Moreover, because the "'affidavit prevents the disclosure of all that information,' the
entire case had to be dismissed with prejudice." Id. (internal citation omitted).
246. Id. at 153-54.
247. Id. at 155. Due to the CIPA's special treatment of substitutes for classified information, the
257
court ruled against the silent witness rule proposal because of the untimely
attempt and hurried introduction by the government. 24' The hurried and
unorganized nature of the proposal's introduction also led the circuit to find
that "the government's presentation of the proposal before the district court
was sketchy at best" because it did not address whether use of the silent
witness rule would give Fernandez enough latitude to tell his story. 249 The
Fourth Circuit reviewed the substitutions "with some care." Id. at 157. Although "a trial court must
accept the government's proposed substitutions 'if it finds that the statement or summary will
provide the defendant with substantially the same ability to make his defense,"' the circuit affirmed
that none of the government's section 6(c) substitution proposals adhered to the CIPA's
requirements. Id. at 161 (quoting Classified Information Procedures Act § 6(c)(1)). A court is
required to accept the proposed substitutions only if the defendant is left with substantially the same
ability to provide for defense. Classified Information Procedures Act § 6(c)(1).
248. Fernandez, 913 F.2d at 160-62. The government proposed the silent witness rule at the last
minute. Id. at 161. According to the circuit court, "[t]he district court's rejection of the
government's proposed substitution presented just prior to jury selection on the morning of trial also
[did] not amount to abuse of discretion. The government made this belated proposal to the trial
judge ten minutes after jury selection was set to begin." Id. Fernandez's attorney objected to the
silent witness rule proposal and stated:
This court has ruled time and time again that the specific locations are crucial to the
defense in this case. It is going to be necessary for the defense to identify on maps so the
jury will be able to see graphically where these various locations are in order to tell the
story that needs to be told in order to defend Mr. Fernandez.
Id. at 161-62. The trial judge also noted his frustration at the government's last minute proposal:
I guess I am kind of at this point that I am getting a little impatient with the pace at which
we are moving here. It is now ten minutes after ten, and we were supposed to start
selecting a jury at 10 O'clock this morning. We had a CIPA hearing better than a week
ago. In fact, we had the hearing over two days. My ruling was very clear.
Id. at 162.
249. Id. The district court was adamant that Fernandez be allowed to disclose certain classified
locations because they were imperative to his argument. Id. at 153. The court already ruled the
evidence was relevant during the CIPA relevancy hearings. Id. The Fourth Circuit clearly stated
their own findings:
In addition, the key card proposal, though ingenious, is an artificial means of presenting
evidence. Although embellished on appeal, the government's presentation of the
proposal before the district court was sketchy at best. Perhaps in part because the key
card proposal was presented in a belated and hurried fashion, the government never made
it clear to the trial judge, and indeed it remains unclear to us, how much latitude the key
card substitutes would give Fernandez to tell his story about the CIA involvement in the
resupply operation. The litigants continue to disagree strongly about the scope of the key
card proposal. To take but one example, Fernandez contends that the card system would
not allow him to point out in open court * * * * (a point central to his defense), while
Independent Counsel insists that it would. CIPA charges the government with proposing
the substitutions ... and we think the burden must be on the government to delineate the
substitutions' precise scope before the trial court.
Id. at 162 (internal citations omitted); see also id. at 150 n.] (noting that the court used asterisks to
indicate the omission of classified information). Additionally, the circuit held that it was within the
district court's discretion to consider how the "complicated key card system might confuse or
distract the jury." Id. at 162. The court continued:
With this system, the * * * * would be referred to as * * * * and the witnesses and the
jury would apparently consult a key card to discover their actual locations. Jurors would
thus have to make continuous reference to a key card and a map while at the same time
258
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Fourth Circuit finally rejected the use of the silent witness rule "in light of
the belatedness and artificiality of the proposed substitution, the uncertainty
about its scope, its potential to confuse the jury, and the district court's prior
valid findings that the... identity. . . was essential to Fernandez's
defense."25  The rule was not rejected because of an inherent flaw, but
instead due to poor presentation and uncertainty regarding whether the rule
would afford Fernandez the ability to make a defense.25 '
In two of the first three government attempts to introduce the silent
witness rule at trial, the district court denied the proposal due to the
particular circumstances of the cases. 2 52  In the third attempt, the court
approved the proposal, but it was never implemented because of
interlocutory appeal by the government.253  Yet each of these cases
demonstrates judicial approval of the silent witness rule.254 Not until United
States v. Rosen did the court explicitly endorse the use of the silent witness
rule.
C. United States v. Rosen: Victory for the Silent Witness Rule
Perhaps the best way to implement a solution to the state secrets
"problem" is to use existing laws and mechanisms in new and creative
ways-enter the silent witness rule and its conception from the language of
the CIPA.255 The court in United States v. Rosen stands for the first real
approval of the creative silent witness rule in criminal trials. 256
focusing on the content of the testimony.
Id.
250. Id. "It seems clear, therefore, that the key card proposal was far from an interchangeable
substitute for the real thing." Id.
251. Id.
252. See id. at 161-62; see also United States v. North, No. 88-0080-02, 1988 WL 148481, at *3
(D.D.C. Dec. 12, 1988).
253. See United States v. Zettl, 835 F.2d 1059, 1063-64 (4th Cir. 1987).
254. United States v. Rosen, 520 F. Supp. 2d 786, 794 (E.D. Va. 2007).
The [silent witness rule] is a novel evidence presentation technique that has received little
judicial attention in the context of the use of classified information in trials. No
published decision has explicitly approved or endorsed use of the rule in this context.
Indeed, the government has only proposed the [silent witness rule] in three reported
cases.
Id. "And, indeed, while no court has squarely addressed this precise question, a few courts have
implicitly approved the use of the [silent witness rule] at trial." Id. at 796.
255. By using existing law to combat state secrets issues, solutions will not have to wait until
legislative action moves forward or the judiciary decides to take a strong stand against government
assertions of the state secrets privilege.
256. See Rosen, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 797 n.20 (approving use of the silent witness rule for part of
259
In late 2007, United States District Court Judge T. S. Ellis approved the
limited use of the "silent witness rule" for a four-minute and six-second
segment of recorded conversation to be used as evidence at trial.257 The
decision marks the first time the rule has received approval and significant
discussion in a published opinion.258 The proposal was couched in existing
legislation-the CIPA 259-in a novel attempt to protect classified
information from public disclosure while allowing the trial to move
forward. 60  Judge Ellis's memorandum opinion devoted substantial
discussion to the viability of the silent witness rule and caught the attention
of commentators and critics.2 61  His conclusion that the rule can comport
with strict constitutional concerns for criminal actions implicitly approves
the rule for use in the civil arena, and hence cases involving the state secrets
privilege.262
Judge Ellis discussed the theory and constitutional viability of the silent
witness rule in a published opinion, but reserved application of his findings
to Rosen's facts through a sealed non-public order. 263  The public only
knows that Judge Ellis actually approved the rule for use in Rosen due to a
footnote in the published opinion.26
recorded conversations); see also supra Part IV.B (discussing implicit approvals of the silent witness
rule). Although federal courts considered the silent witness rule on several occasions, no court
approved or implemented it in any case. See supra Part IV.B.
257. Rosen, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 797 n.20.
258. In only one other case was the rule explicitly approved, United States v. Zettl, 835 F.2d 1059,
1063 (4th Cir. 1987), but the evidentiary rulings were appealed to the Fourth Circuit and so the rule
was never implemented. See supra Part IV.B. I.
259. See supra Part III (presenting and discussing the CIPA).
260. See supra Part IV.A; see also supra notes 205-10 and accompanying text (relating the
government's attempt to introduce the silent witness rule under the CIPA).
261. See generally Rosen, 520 F. Supp. 2d 786; see also Secrecy News, AIPAC Court Considers
"Silent Witness" Procedure, http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2007.html (Mar. 27, 2007); Secrecy
News, AIPAC Court Adopts Silent Witness Rule, http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2007.html (Nov.
7, 2007).
262. See Stein, supra note 28, at 1, 8, 9.
263. Rosen, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 793-99 (discussing the silent witness rule and its viability given
the procedures mandated under the CIPA). "A separate classified, sealed order will issue applying
the principles elucidated here and setting forth the specific rulings made with respect to the
government's second CIPA [section] 6(c) motion." Id. at 802.
264. Id. at 797 n.20 ("During the course of the [section] 6(c) hearings, the use of the [silent
witness rule] was approved for only four minutes and six seconds (4:06), out of a total of four hours,
thirteen minutes and fifty-one seconds (4:13:51) of recorded conversations.").
260
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1. Brief Facts
265
In 2005, the government charged defendants Steven Rosen and Keith
Weissman with violations of the Espionage Act.266  Generally, the
indictments charged that the defendants cultivated sources in the United
States government in order to obtain access to classified National Defense
Information (NDI)-conspiring to pass the information to members of the
American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and others.267 The
defendants allegedly passed classified information to foreign officials and
media personnel, and continued to meet with sources inside the United
States government for a period of years between 1999 and 2004.268 Other
particular facts of this case are not necessary to this discussion; it is merely
265. The information contained in this section is drawn from a single case with multiple published
orders and opinions from the Eastern District of Virginia. The facts of the opinion analyzed in this
Comment, United States v. Rosen, 520 F. Supp. 2d 786, 794 (E.D. Va. 2007), were not clear from
the opinion itself. Therefore, some of the facts are drawn from another opinion in the same case,
United States v. Rosen (Rosen 1), 445 F. Supp. 2d 602, 608 (E.D. Va. 2006). Yet, many of the
specific facts in this case do not bear on the analysis of the silent witness rule and are not necessary
to relate, although some are discussed later. See infra notes 267-68.
266. Rosen, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 789. The government charged defendants with "conspiracy to
violate the Espionage Act, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(g) and (e)." Id. As well, the government
charged Rosen individually with "aiding and abetting... [in the] unauthorized disclosure of national
defense information, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 793(d)." Id.
267. Rosen 1, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 608-09. AIPAC employed Rosen and Weissman during the
times relevant to this case. Id. at 608. AIPAC is an organization that lobbies the United States
government on behalf of Israel. Id. at 607. Many of the court documents were filed under seal and
are not available to the public. Rosen, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 789. Specifically, AIPAC employed
Rosen as its Director of Foreign Policy Issues while co-defendant Weissman was employed as
AIPAC's Senior Middle East Analyst. Rosen 1, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 608. Rosen once held a security
clearance during years in the 1970s and 1980s pursuant to employment at the RAND Corporation.
Id. The clearance was terminated in 1982. Id. Weissman never had a security clearance as far as
the Court was aware. Id.
268. Rosen 1, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602, 608-11. According to the indictment, Rosen related
intelligence information to a foreign official on April 13, 1999. Id. at 608. Weissman told the same
foreign official on June 11, 1999 that he had obtained a secret FBI report related to a specific
bombing of the Khobar Towers. Id. On December 12, 2000, both Rosen and Weissman allegedly
met with a United States government official who had access to classified information. Id. On
January 18 and March 12, 2002, Rosen allegedly received classified information from a different
United States official and relayed it to AIPAC employees and foreign nationals. Id. at 608-09. On
February 12, 2003, Rosen and Weissman allegedly met with a United States Department of Defense
employee, Lawrence Franklin, who relayed classified information to them. Id. at 609. Rosen related
some of this information to the media in 2003. Id. On June 26, 2003, Franklin related classified
information to Rosen and Weissman concerning attacks on United States service men in Iraq. Id.
The FBI began an investigation of Rosen and Weissman with the cooperation of Franklin in 2004.
Id. at 609-10.
pertinent that the government charged Rosen and Weissman with criminal
violations of the Espionage Act.
269
2. The Government's Proposal
Due to the nature of the criminal case, involving large amounts of
classified information, the CIPA governed the procedures for use and
discovery of the classified information in Rosen.270 Initially the government
filed a motion seeking to use the silent witness rule on most of the classified
information to be presented at trial. 27 ' The court denied this first motion
and, in fact, struck the motion entirely from the record.272 Of note, the court
struck the motion because "the government's proposed extensive use of the
[silent witness rule] effectively closed the trial to the public and ... the
government had not adequately justified this trial closure. 273
In a second CIPA section 6(c) motion, the government limited the
proposed use of the silent witness rule and additionally proposed that section
6(c) substitutions be made available both to the jury and to the public. 274
According to the court the proposal was "now ripe for resolution," allowing
Judge Ellis to render a decision on the motion for use of the proposed silent
witness rule.275
269. See infra note 266.
270. Rosen, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 789 ("This case involves a large volume of classified information.
Discovery of such information, and its use at trial, is governed by [the] CIPA."). The CIPA is the
statutory mandate for the handling of classified information during a federal criminal trial. See
supra Part III (presenting and discussing the CIPA).
271. Rosen, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 790.
272. Id.
273. Id. Under Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984), there exists a
presumption of trial openness:
The open trial thus plays as important a role in the administration of justice today as it did
for centuries before our separation from England. The value of openness lies in the fact
that people not actually attending trials can have confidence that standards of fairness are
being observed; the sure knowledge that anyone is free to attend gives assurance that
established procedures are being followed and that deviations will become known.
Openness thus enhances both the basic fairness of the criminal trial and the appearance of
fairness so essential to public confidence in the system.
Id. at 508 (citing Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569-71 (1980)).
The presumption of openness may be overcome only by an overriding interest based on
findings that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to
serve that interest. The interest is to be articulated along with findings specific enough
that a reviewing court can determine whether the closure order was properly entered.
Id. at 510. According to the district court in Rosen, the case presently discussed, the government did
not meet the applicable Press-Enterprise standard for a closed trial. Rosen, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 790.
274. Rosen, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 790. The court requested briefs from both the prosecution and the
defense regarding whether the CIPA allows the use of the silent witness rule. Id.; see also infra
notes 294, 304, 311 and accompanying text.
275. Rosen, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 790 ("The motion has been fully briefed and argued, and is now
ripe for resolution.").
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Before discussing the viability of the silent witness rule, the court first
stated that the purpose of the CIPA "is to identify in advance of trial the
universe of classified information to be disclosed at trial and to minimize
unnecessary disclosure of classified information by use of substitutions,
redactions, and summaries that do not meaningfully impair defendants'
ability to present a defense. 276 The statement sets the tone for Judge Ellis
to analyze the silent witness rule and to pay special attention to defendant
Rosen's ability to present a defense. Additionally, the court noted that the
purpose of CIPA section 6(c) substitution rule is to provide fairness for both
parties at trial while providing adequate protection for classified
information. 77 The court also paid special attention to its charge to be
sensitive "to the dynamics of jury trials and to the ways in which typical
jurors respond to evidence and a judge's instructions. 278
3. Judge Ellis's Examination
Judge Ellis defined the silent witness rule as "a procedure whereby
certain evidence designated by the government is made known to the judge,
the jury, counsel, and witnesses, but is withheld from the public. ' 27 9 The
process, as understood by Judge Ellis, involved a system of references to
commonly used codes corresponding to particular pieces of information.280
Counsel would refer to a code during trial and the judge, jury, counsel, and
witnesses would refer to a key, alerting pertinent parties to the definition or
information of reference.28' When the silent witness rule relates to recorded
evidence, then counsel, jurors, witnesses, and the judge would have access to
276. Id. The court also acknowledged that the goal of protecting classified information while
allowing the defendant to present an adequate defense is difficult in complex cases such as the one at
bar. Id. Indeed, eleven section 6(c) substitution hearing days had already been conducted, and the
court anticipated many more. Id.
277. Id. ("It is quite clear.., that the touchstone of permissible CIPA [section] 6(c) substitutions,
summaries or redactions is fairness.").
278. Id. at 791. The CIPA not only turns on the ability of the court to determine whether actual
evidence is admissible at trial, but how the introduction of substituted evidence will affect the jury's
understanding of the evidence. Id. Fairness to both parties in trial is also determined in part by the
court's ability to relate expectations and instructions to the jury. Id. Therefore, the court will
consider the jury in making decisions on relevance of evidence. Id.
279. Id. at 793.
280. Id. at 793-94. According to Judge Ellis, "[u]nder this procedure, a witness referring to this
evidence would not specifically identify or describe it, but would instead refer to it by reference to
page and line numbers of a document or transcript, or more commonly by use of codes such as
'Person I,' or 'Country A,' etc." Id. at 793.
281. Id. at 793-94.
263
headphones over which the sound recording would be played.282 The public
would not have access to the key cards, classified documents, or
recordings.
23
However, Judge Ellis noted a major flaw in the silent witness rule
relating to accidental disclosure during use of the key cards.284  Although
counsel might well be careful to refer only to the code names, the witness is
not bound during cross-examination to refer to the same codes when
speaking on personal identifying information or experiences. 285  Utilizing a
version of Judge Ellis's own example, "City X' might indeed be code for
Seattle, Washington in the United States.286 Throughout testimony the
witness would be bound to adhere to the code name when speaking on the
classified information, but upon cross examination the witness might be
asked the city of his current residence.287 If the witness also lives in Seattle,
Washington, the public might easily be able to deduce that "City X' is the
same Seattle, Washington. 218 Although such a deduction might not be
conclusive, it certainly poses a risk to disclosure.289
Framing the issues for examination, Judge Ellis went on to note that the
silent witness rule has the effect of closing parts of the trial to the public and
therefore, possesses qualities distinguishable from the CIPA.29 ° Whereas
use of classic CIPA procedures involving substitutions, summaries, and
redactions of classified information allow both the public and the parties to
hear the very same trial, the result of the silent witness rule is that trial
participants hear and see a different trial than the public.291  But the main
282. Id. at 794.
Any recordings containing the portions designated for [silent witness rule] treatment
would be played in open court, but would revert to static when the portions designated to
be treated under the [silent witness rule] are reached; thus, the public would not hear
these portions. At the same time, however, jurors, counsel, and the judge would listen on
headphones to the unredacted recording.
Id.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 794 n.10. "It is important to note that it became apparent during the course of CIPA
[section] 6(c) hearings that vigorous cross-examination may well lead to disclosure in open court of
information sought to be protected by the [silent witness rule]." Id. Thus, in such circumstances the
silent witness rule will not achieve its goal of prohibiting disclosure.
285. See id.
286. See id.
287. See id.
288. The example of "City X" is an iteration of the example used by Judge Ellis in his opinion,
recognizing that the public might be able to deduct the meaning of the code word through a
witness's answers to other questions. See id.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 794. CIPA substitutions are publicly available while the silent witness rule keeps
information hidden from public consumption. Id.
291. Id.
Use of conventional CIPA [section] 6(c) substitutions, summaries, and redactions results
264
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issue, according to Judge Ellis, was whether the use of the silent witness rule
was permissible within the legal framework established by the CIPA.292
Indeed, Judge Ellis discussed whether the CIPA provided the only procedure
for use of classified information at trial, which would have precluded the
court from considering the silent witness rule.293
However, the beauty of the government's proposed silent witness rule
was that it was marketed as a CIPA section 6(c) substitution.294 Therefore,
if the court found the CIPA to be the only permissible way for dealing with
classified information, then the silent witness rule was still viable. 295  "Put
differently, the question is whether CIPA provides the exclusive means of
dealing with classified information in criminal trials and, even if so, whether
the [silent witness rule] can be said to be authorized by CIPA [section] 6(c)
as constituting a species of 'summary' or 'substitution' under that
provision. 296 Therefore, the government's proposed silent witness rule was
a new attempt to provide a CIPA substitute for classified information at
trial.297
Indeed, the silent witness rule is a novel idea that has sustained minimal
judicial scrutiny.298 According to Judge Ellis, the government only proposed
the rule by name in three reported cases.299 In only one of these three cases,
in trial participants and the public seeing and hearing the same trial, whereas use of the
[silent witness rule] results in the trial participants hearing or seeing some evidence the
public does not see or hear. In other words, the [silent witness rule] results in closing a
part of the trial to the public.
Id.
292. Id. at 795 ("The threshold question that must be resolved with respect to the [silent witness
rule]'s use in this case is whether it is even permissible to use in the CIPA context.").
293. Id.
294. Id. at 794. Judge Ellis called the silent witness rule "a novel evidence presentation
technique." Id. The government, in its supporting brief, called for the court to read the CIPA
section 6(c) substitution procedure broadly.
Specifically, Section 6(c)(1) provides for an alternative to disclosure of the specific
classified information at trial. This provision of CIPA, allowing the court to order
substitutions should be read broadly. The silent witness rule is a type of substitution and
is an alternative to disclosure of the information at trial as contemplated by CIPA.
Government's Memorandum of Law Addressing Use of the "Silent Witness Rule" as Permitted by
the Classified Information Procedures Act at 2, United States v. Rosen, No. 1:05-CR-225 (E.D. Va.
Aug. 29, 2007), 2007 WL 3352462 (emphasis added).
295. Rosen, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 794; see also supra note 294.
296. Rosen, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 795.
297. See supra note 294 and accompanying text (discussing the government's position that the
silent witness rule is a type of substitution permitted under the CIPA).
298. Rosen, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 794-95.
299. Id. at 794. The cases with published dispositions include United States v. Fernandez, 913
F.2d 148 (4th Cir. 1990), United States v. North, No. 88-0080-02, 1988 WL 148481(D.D.C. Dec. 12,
265
did the court tacitly approve the use of the rule.300 However, the silent
witness rule was never actually used in the trial because of a government
appeal from other evidentiary decisions in that case. 30 1 Moreover, Judge
Ellis suggested that other decisions approved presentations of evidence
where the trial participants had different access to evidence than the
public-a striking similarity to the silent witness rule. 302  There was, and is,
little written analysis of the rule with regard to the procedures outlined in the
CIPA 303
Outlining the arguments against the silent witness rule, Judge Ellis cited
defendant Rosen's chief argument, namely that the CIPA's comprehensive
treatment of classified information suggests that Congress intended the
CIPA to prescribe the only method of handling classified evidence at trial.30 4
Judge Ellis disagreed with Rosen's characterization, because the "CIPA,
while undeniably detailed in some respects, is neither explicitly nor
implicitly exclusive as to the trial treatment of classified information."3 5
1998), and United States v. Zettl, 835 F.2d 1059 (4th Cir. 1987). Rosen, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 794 n.l 1;
see also discussion supra Part IV.B.
300. Rosen, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 794.
301. Id. The Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit did not reach the issue of the silent witness
rule in their published decision; the government appealed the evidentiary rulings of the district court
to the court of appeals through a CIPA sanctioned interlocutory appeal. See supra Part IV.B.1
(discussing Zettl, 835 F.2d 1059).
302. Rosen, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 796. The "implicit" and "similar evidence" approvals have been
discussed, at length, earlier in this Comment. See supra Part IV.B. However, the case against
Zacarias Moussaoui in the Eastern District of Virginia, contains a reference to approval of the silent
witness rule in a footnote to an order regarding publication of documentary evidence: "Excepted
from this Order are all classified exhibits published to the jury under the silent witness rule." Order
at I n.I, United States v. Moussaoui, No. 01-CR-455 LMB (E.D. Va. Mar. 24, 2006),
http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01 -cr-00455/docs/71918/0.pdf.
303. Rosen, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 794-96. According to Judge Ellis, "[t]his paucity of judicial
precedent on the [silent witness rule]'s use in CIPA cases counsels caution with respect to its use in
this context." Id. at 794-95.
304. Id. at 795. Rosen argued that Congress implemented comprehensive legislation to deal with
the problem of graymail in national security litigation. Supplemental Brief Regarding
Inapplicability of the Silent Witness Rule at 15, United States v. Rosen, No. 05-CR-225 (E.D. Va.
2007), 2007 WL 3352463. According to Rosen, Congress considered all the possible implications
and issues surrounding the use of classified information in trial when implementing the CIPA. Id.
One of the main issues Congress dealt with was the competing interest of the constitutional right to
public trial. Id. at 16. "Given the comprehensive nature of the CIPA legislation, CIPA's omission
of any mechanism for closure of trial proceedings reflects the choice that the Administration
advocated and Congress enacted to protect the values served by fully open, public trials." Id.
Moreover, Rosen argued that Congress did not intend any additional steps that the prosecution could
take to avoid disclosure (short of dismissing the action or submitting an affidavit by the head of the
executive agency prohibiting disclosure) once the evidence passed safely through the section 6(c)
substitution and relevancy hearings. Id. Rosen concluded that "[t]he Justice Department and
Congress proceeded with the understanding that, but for CIPA's summaries, stipulations and
redactions, the choice was for the government to disclose or dismiss-not to be accorded a different
type of bite at the apple." Id. at 17.
305. Rosen, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 795. The CIPA fails to provide guidance on any number of issues
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Therefore, the CIPA does not immediately preclude the use of the silent
witness rule at trial.3 °6
However, Judge Ellis did find that the silent witness rule was not merely
another version of CIPA section 6(c) substitution.30 7 He reasoned that
unlike the proposed silent witness rule, CIPA substitutions do not effectively
close parts of the trial to the public.30 8  The CIPA envisions that
documentary evidence and court testimony will be available for public
consumption in the same form as given to the trial participants.30 9 Judge
Ellis unequivocally stated that "the [silent witness rule] is not part of
CIPA."' 10 As such, he quickly disposed of Rosen's argument that the silent
witness rule runs afoul of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 26. a"
relating to the use of classified information at trial. Id. at 795-96. There exists no statutory
guidance on classification markings as possibly hearsay, limiting jury instructions, witness testimony
by pseudonym or other concealment, access of experts to the classified information, or the classified
information privilege. Id.
306. Id. at 796. "In sum, CIPA is neither exhaustive nor explicitly exclusive with respect to the
presentation of classified testimony or documents at trial. It follows that CIPA cannot be said to
exclude the use of the [silent witness rule] at trial." Id. Judge Ellis recognized that because the
CIPA failed to provide guidance on many issues that arise when dealing with classified evidence at
trial, the defendant's contention that the CIPA provides all exclusive means for the use of such
classified information did not hold any weight. Id.
307. Id. at 797.
308. Id.
309. Id. Judge Ellis states that:
CIPA [section] 6(c) redactions and substitutions, unlike the [silent witness rule], do not
effect any closing of the trial to the public. To the contrary, CIPA plainly envisions that
substitutions and redactions will be made available in the same form to the public as to
the trial participants. This is confirmed not only by the plain meaning of CIPA's text, but
also by the absence of any statutory language or legislative history concerning the First
Amendment considerations raised by the partial closing of the trial that results from the
[silent witness rule]'s use.
Id.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 796-97. The majority of the defendant's brief to the court regarding the inapplicability
of the silent witness rule rested on Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 26. See Supplemental Brief
Regarding Inapplicability of the Silent Witness Rule at 15, United States v. Rosen, No. 05-CR-225
(E.D. Va. 2007), 2007 WL 3352463. The rule reads as follows: "In every trial the testimony of
witnesses must be taken in open court, unless otherwise provided by a statute or by rules adopted
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072-2077." FED. R. CRlM. P. 26. Yet Judge Ellis was not persuaded, even for
a moment. In fact, he brushed aside the defendant's argument with haste.
Nor is Rule 26 of any aid to defendants' argument. The Rule is general and aspirational
and suffers the fate of all general rules: It has well-established exceptions. Courts in
criminal cases have in a variety of circumstances partially closed proceedings to
accommodate overriding interests, such as the safety of confidential informants and
undercover officers. The [silent witness rule] is simply another of these exceptions.
Rosen, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 796-97.
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Judge Ellis moved forward with a "fairness" analysis of the silent
witness rule due to the court's charge, under the CIPA, to provide the
defendant "substantially the same ability" to proceed with a defense as
would have been available given the use of the classified information.
31 2
The court found that a "fairness" analysis under the silent witness rule would
be more difficult than the analysis under the CIPA because the rule required
the court to "consider all the mechanics" of the rule's use at trial.3" 3 Yet,
because Judge Ellis determined that the silent witness rule is not a part of the
CIPA, the "substantially the same ability" test did not apply.31 4 Therefore,
the court took the more difficult and expansive view of fairness, deciding
that a court must determine whether the silent witness rule hampered the
defendant's ability under the CIPA "fairness test" to
fairly present evidence, cross-examine, and argue to the jury about
the facts protected by the [silent witness rule], whether an ordinary
juror will be able to follow the evidence and argument if presented
by the [silent witness rule], and whether the prejudice from the
rule's use is curable by an instruction or otherwise.315
The silent witness rule also raised Sixth Amendment concerns with
regard to the defendant's right to an open trial, because the rule effectively
closes parts of the trial to the public.31 6 Conveniently, Judge Ellis found that
312. Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. App. 3 § 6(c)(1) (1980) ("The court shall
grant such a motion of the United States if it finds that the statement or summary will provide the
defendant with substantially the same ability to make his defense as would disclosure of the specific
classified information.").
313. Rosen, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 798. It was easy for Judge Ellis to dismiss some of the tests for
unfairness, because "the [silent witness rule], unlike a conventional summary or redaction, permits
the jury to view the actual evidence the government seeks to protect from public disclosure, there is
no potential for unfairness based on the factfinder's inability to learn relevant, classified facts which
have been summarized or redacted out." Id. Yet substantial unfairness was possible according the
Judge Ellis, based on the practical implementation and use of the rule at trial:
Yet there is potential for unfairness in the [silent witness rule]'s use; it lies (i) in the
awkwardness of presentation and resulting jury confusion, (ii) in witnesses' and counsel's
inability to explore fully and argue about the facts protected by the [silent witness rule],
and (iii) in the prejudice from employing a procedure that suggests to the jury that the
information being discussed is a closely-held government secret when the jury itself must
decide that very issue.
Id. (citing United States v. Rosen, 487 F. Supp. 2d 703, 707-21 (E.D. Va. 2007)).
314. Rosen, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 798.
315. Id. at 799. Judge Ellis noted that the new fairness analysis "is no easy task, but it is
required." Id.
316. Id.
This right helps ensure that the public sees the evidence and proceedings so that it can
make its own assessment about the fairness of the proceedings. This public scrutiny of a
trial provides some insurance against an unfair prosecution or proceeding. The public's
assessment of the fairness of a trial may be impaired by the use of the [silent witness rule]
[Vol. 36: 213, 2008] The Muted Rise of the Silent Witness Rule
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
the "public trial concern is adequately accommodated by the Press-
Enterprise test for trial closure, as the analysis for closing a trial under the
First Amendment is the same as the analysis required for closing a trial
under the Sixth Amendment., 317 For Judge Ellis to justify the use of the
silent witness rule, it had to pass both the CIPA "fairness test" and the
constitutional fairness test outlined by the Supreme Court in Press-
Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court.
31 8
To summarize, because the concerns animating both Press-
Enterprise and CIPA are present when the [silent witness rule] is
used, it is appropriate to approve use of the [silent witness rule] only
when both tests are satisfied, that is only when the government
establishes (i) an overriding reason for closing the trial, (ii) that the
closure is no broader than necessary to protect that interest, (iii) that
no reasonable alternatives exist to closure, and (iv) that the use of
the [silent witness rule] provides defendants with substantially the
same ability to make their defense as full public disclosure of the
evidence, presented without the use of codes.31 9
Unfortunately, the classified nature of the issues in Rosen precluded Judge
Ellis from publicly disclosing his application of the decision to the particular
facts of the case.32 ° Yet, the opinion does note that the court approved the
very limited use of the silent witness rule for a segment of recorded
conversation-implying that Rosen indeed met the tests.32
if that use distorts the meaning of the underlying evidence.
Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial ....").
317. Rosen, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 799. The Press-Enterprise test for trial closure is met when there
is a compelling interest to justify trial closure, the closure is not overly broad, and no reasonable
alternatives to trial closure exist. Id. (citing Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct., 464 U.S. 501, 509-
10(1984)).
318. See Press-Enter. Co., 464 U.S. at 508; Rosen, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 799.
319. Rosen, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 799.
320. Id. at 802 ("This Memorandum Opinion outlines the legal principles governing the
disposition of the government's second motion pursuant to CIPA [section] 6(c). A separate
classified, sealed order will issue applying the principles elucidated here and setting forth the
specific rulings made with respect to the government's second CIPA [section] 6(c) motion.").
321. See supra note 257 and accompanying text (noting Judge Ellis's approval of the silent
witness rule).
4. A State Secrets Solution
Since the government generally uses the state secrets privilege when it is
a defendant in civil cases, the silent witness rule might first appear to be
lacking since Rosen approved it for use in criminal actions.322 Yet criminal
cases have unique constitutional concerns not present in the civil arena.323 It
follows that if the silent witness rule meets constitutional requirements for
criminal actions, it could be applied as an alternative to state secrets
dismissals of civil actions. Thus, the silent witness rule provides a much
needed alternative to state secrets dismissals and provides a real avenue for
litigating civil claims against the government while protecting sensitive
government information from public disclosure. In fact, the ABA argued for
new legislation similar to the CIPA, which sets policies and procedures for
the use of classified information at trial.3 2 4  Legislation that satisfies the
CIPA's constitutional concerns in criminal cases will, necessarily, make
application to civil cases constitutionally viable. 325  Therefore, Rosen's
approval for use in criminal trial paves the way for use in the civil arena; the
silent witness rule provides a viable way to present classified information to
the court during litigation while keeping the information from the public.
3 26
The silent witness rule's use in civil litigation could change the current
norms regarding the state secrets privilege-E1-Masri's claims of torture and
extraordinary rendition would have been adjudicated in a court of law while
the families in Reynolds may not have felt betrayed by their government.
327
Judge Ellis may have been the first judge to explicitly approve the use of
the silent witness rule in a case moving forward.328 Indeed, the rule survived
constitutional scrutiny for use at a criminal proceeding, although the rule's
use at a criminal trial is governed by multiple tests. 329 However, use of the
silent witness rule in civil actions against the United States would likely pass
the Press-Enterprise test in most every situation. In state secrets cases, the
322. Stein, supra note 28, at 1.
323. Id. at 1, 8, 9.
324. Id. at 8-9. As mentioned previously, the CIPA outlines specific procedures which a court
must follow when classified information is used as evidence in federal criminal trials. Classified
Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 1-16 (1980). As well, the CIPA offers procedures
designed to protect the secrecy of the classified information used at such trials, allowing the
government to pursue alternatives to disclosure such as submission of redacted documents or
summaries of pertinent information. Id. § 4.
325. See Stein, supra note 28, at 8-9. "CIPA (and the Fifth and Sixth Amendment principles
underlying CIPA) do not apply in civil cases . I..." Id. at 8. "The lesser standard incorporated into
the proposed policy recognizes that the Fifth and Sixth Amendment interests underlying CIPA do
not apply in a civil case." Id. at 9.
326. See supra Part IV.A.
327. See supra notes 1-10, 62-70, 75-77, 90-96 and accompanying text.
328. See supra notes 298-301, 303 and accompanying text.
329. See supra notes 314-19 and accompanying text.
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plaintiff is left without a venue to assert a claim, so meeting the test should
prove no obstacle-a closed trial is better than no trial.330 Moreover, state
secrets cases would likely pass the CIPA fairness test, because the
government as defendant would not be in a different evidentiary position
than before the privilege was invoked. 33' Therefore, the rule could be used
in civil actions and also as a solution to the state secrets "problem.
332
V. CONCLUSION
Although the silent witness rule is still in the early stages of judicial
development and approval, it provides a new avenue for addressing state
secrets dismissals.333 Certainly the silent witness rule could have enabled
Khaled El-Masri to litigate his claims of extraordinary rendition.334 Yet
even with the protections afforded to classified information under such a
rule, the government might still make a reasonable case that any possibility
of disclosure outweighs the public interest in a trial on the merits. 3 5 The
government has the final say on whether the risk of disclosure is too great,
and rightly so.
336
Although the additional tests do not seem to create a significant new
burden for the silent witness rule's application in Rosen, the added
requirements still supply another hurdle for criminal and civil actions to
clear.337 As this Comment is theoretical in its approach to the state secrets
"problem," this additional hurdle supplies more questions than answers
regarding the practicability of applying the rule to the civil arena. Will the
cases that most deserve adjudication on the merits be able to pass the tests?
Moreover, Judge Ellis approved only a very small segment of testimony for
silent witness rule application; will the rule crumble under the weight of
large amounts of classified information? 338  And since this is a trial court
opinion, will higher courts accept Judge Ellis's analysis? Rosen is indeed a
victory for the silent witness rule, but it is hardly decisive.
330. See supra notes 34, 37, 78 and accompanying text.
331. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
332. See supra Part IV.C.4.
333. See supra notes 322-32 and accompanying text.
334. See supra Part I.
335. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
336. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
337. See supra notes 312-21, 330-31 and accompanying text.
338. See supra notes 257, 321 and accompanying text.
Nonetheless, the story should still be told, and the rule has potential. It
wound its way slowly through American jurisprudence, waiting twenty or
more years before full approval, but Judge Ellis found it ripe for decision at
just the moment state secrets opponents' cries grew loudest. It remains to be
seen whether Congress or the judiciary will grab hold of it, but the rule's
silent rise cannot be ignored.
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